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THE PREEMPLOYMENT ETHICAL ROLE OF LAWYERS: ARE
LAWYERS REALLY FIDUCIARIES?
FRED C. ZACHARIAS*
ABSTRACT
This Article considers the nature and extent of lawyers'obligations
to prospective clients. Most jurisdictions have rules forbidding
certain kinds of representation, requiring that particular information
be given clients in writing, and regulating fees. Professional code
drafters, courts, and commentators, however, have never addressed
the broader issue of the lawyer's role at the retainer stage of represen-
tation, including whether lawyers have responsibility for providing
prospective clients with candid advice regarding the course they
should pursue.
The issue is important to clients. A lawyer's action may determine
whether a client obtains any representation, competent representa-
tion, or a lawyer well suited to the task. It also affects the client's
consideration of alternatives-including alternative methods of
resolving the legal matter and whether lower cost or specialized
representation might be available.
The issue is equally important to the bar. Most legal ethics codes
free lawyers to compete for all types of legal work, regardless of how
experienced or qualified they are. The fiction that lawyers are
fungible, or (at some level) equally competent, underlies the current
regime of lawyer regulation and is designed, at least in part, to
protect the guild. Although legal ethics regulation places restrictions
on how lawyers may solicit business, once a prospective client comes
to a lawyer, virtually the only explicit constraint on the lawyer's
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ability to accept the case is that the lawyer provide minimally
competent service.
This Article argues that the professional regulatory scheme should
clarify and facilitate enforcement of lawyers' preemployment
obligations. Depending on one's view of existing law, this can be
accomplished either through refined interpretation of the profes-
sional rules and common law standards or through amendments to
the legal ethics codes. The Article then analyzes the significance of
defining a lawyer's preemployment role for the legal ethics regime
and external law regulating the bar. The Article concludes by
offering options, some designed to enhance enforcement of lawyers'
preemployment obligations and others that might serve as independ-
ent alternatives for achieving client protection.
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This Article raises an issue long neglected in legal ethics regula-
tion: what is a lawyer's role at the retainer stage of representation?
Most jurisdictions have rules forbidding certain kinds of representa-
tion,1 requiring particular information to be given to clients in
writing,2 and regulating fees.3 A few judicial opinions and scholarly
works have also asserted either that retainer agreements are arm's
length in nature,4 on the one hand, or that lawyers have fiduciary
responsibilities even before formal employment, on the other.' No
1. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.8 (2006) (forbidding certain
representations freighted with conflicts of interest).
2. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6148 (West 2003) (requiring written retainer
agreements in particular cases); MODEL RULES OF PROFOL CONDUCT R. 1.5(b)-(c) (2006)
(requiring lawyers to give fee and cost information "preferably in writing"); id. R. 1.8(a)
(involving business transactions with clients).
3. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2006).
4. E.g., Setzer v. Robinson, 368 P.2d 124, 126 (Cal. 1962) (holding that an attorney and
client deal at arm's length when agreeing upon the terms of their contract); Ramirez v.
Sturdevant, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 558 (Ct. App. 1994) (noting that "in general, the negotiation
of a fee agreement is an arm's-length transaction"); In re Silverton, No. 95-0-10829, 2001 WL
664251, at *4, *9 (Cal. Bar Ct. May 22, 2001) (holding that negotiation of a fee ordinarily is
an arm's-length transaction, but nevertheless finding discipline appropriate for overreaching);
Brillhart v. Hudson, 455 P.2d 878, 879-80 (Colo. 1969) (affirming the trial court's finding
"from the pleadings that the parties entered into a contract, if in fact they entered into any
contract, for a contingent fee and were dealing at arm's length and the fiduciary relationship
is unimportant in a case of this kind"); Elmore v. Johnson, 32 N.E. 413, 416 (Ill. 1892) ("Before
the attorney undertakes the business of the client, he may contract with reference to his
services, because no confidential relation then exists, and the parties deal with each other at
arm's length."); Edler v. Frazier, 156 N.W. 182, 184-85 (Iowa 1916) (holding that no
confidential relation existed when the parties were negotiating fees because the parties were
dealing at arm's length); Higgins v. Beaty, 88 S.E.2d 80, 82-83 (N.C. 1955) (noting that when
an attorney contracts with his client regarding his fees, parties deal with each other at arm's
length); cf. Lutz v. Belli, 516 N.E.2d 95,98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) ('The facts established by Belli
demonstrate that he and Lutz dealt at arm's length. Under these circumstances, the parties
were free to fix the compensation at whatever figure they thought proper."); Tanox, Inc. v.
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, & Feld, L.L.P., 105 S.W.3d 244, 264-65 (Tex. App. 2003)
(upholding an arbitrator's ruling that fee negotiations between a lawyer and a sophisticated
client were conducted at arm's length).
5. See, e.g., Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F.2d 738, 739 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) ('The fiduciary
relationship between an attorney and his client extends even to preliminary consultations
between the client and the attorney regarding the attorney's possible retention."); Lester
Brickman, The Continuing Assault on the Citadel of Fiduciary Protection: Ethics 2000's
Revision of Model Rule 1.5, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181, 1197-98 (suggesting that courts have
recognized a fiduciary obligation of lawyers to clients at the retainer stage of representation,
especially with respect to fee arrangements); Fred C. Zacharias, Reply to Hyman and Silver:
Clients Should Not Get Less Than They Deserve, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 981, 984 (1998)
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one, however, has directly addressed the broad core question of the
lawyer's ethical role when clients come to discuss potential repre-
sentation.6
The issue is important to clients. A lawyer's preemployment
conduct may determine whether a client obtains any representation,
competent representation, or a lawyer well-suited to the task. It also
affects the client's consideration of alternatives-including alterna-
tive methods of resolving the legal matter-and whether lower cost
or specialized representation might be available.
The issue is equally important to the bar. Most legal ethics codes
free lawyers to compete for all types of legal work, regardless of how
experienced or qualified they are.' The fiction that lawyers are
fungible, or (at some level) equally competent, underlies the current
regime of lawyer regulation' and is designed, at least in part, to
(identifying fiduciary duties lawyers may owe clients at the retainer stage of representation);
Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407, 433 n.138 (1998)
[hereinafter Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts] (arguing that "the lawyer's obligation to prioritize
her client's interests over her own extends to the retainer stage of the representation"); Mark
G. Anderson, Note, Arbitration Clauses in Retainer Agreements: A Lawyer's License to Exploit
the Client, 1992 J. DISP. RESOL. 341, 358 (asserting that a lawyer has a fiduciary obligation
to the client at the retainer stage); cf. Philip Ridenour, Attorney Fees: Where Are We in Kansas,
J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Sept. 2004, at 6, 8 (noting the judicial view that "lawyers are not business
people entitled to charge what the traffic will bear.... [E]ngagement retainers are
inconsistent with the fiduciary duties incumbent on the attorney").
6. Some professional codes do address lawyers' obligations to protect the confidences of
potential clients and to avoid conflicts of interest that may injure them. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18(b)-(c) (2006). In the context of discussing lawyer-client fee
arrangements, particularly contingency fees, Lester Brickman has argued that a fiduciary
duty "attaches whenever a potential client approaches a lawyer in a professional
capacity-even to seek information about the lawyer's fee." Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees
Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 55
(1989). The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers also suggests that the validity of fee
arrangements should depend on some of the factors identified in this Article, including
whether "the client was sophisticated in entering into such arrangements," "the client had a
reasonable opportunity to seek another lawyer," "the lawyer adequately explained the ...
implications of the proposed fee contract," "the client understood the alternatives available
from this lawyer and others," and whether "the contract provide[s] for a fee within the range
commonly charged by other lawyers in similar representations." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. c (2000). This Article addresses the broader question of
what general obligations lawyers have, or should have, at the pre-representation stage and
how those obligations might be implemented.
7. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2006) ("A lawyer can provide
adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.").
8. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice:
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protect the guild.' Although legal ethics regulation places restric-
tions on how lawyers may solicit business, 10 once a potential client
comes to a lawyer, virtually the only explicit regulatory constraint
on a lawyer's ability to accept the case is that the lawyer provide
minimally competent service."
Complicating the issue is the fact that clients differ. One might
expect a lawyer's obligations at the retainer stage to vary with a
potential client's sophistication, experience in legal matters, the
representation options the client might have, and the complexity of
the matter. For the most part, however, the legal ethics codes do
not--on the surface, at least-make these distinctions.
12
This Article argues that the professional regulatory scheme
should clarify and facilitate enforcement of lawyers' preemployment
obligations. Resolving all questions pertaining to a lawyer's ethical
role at the retainer stage, however, is not the Article's purpose. The
issues are complex. Any resolution will have significant effects on
legal practice and the common law and, as a consequence, is likely
to prove controversial. The Article's primary goal is simply to make
sure the subject receives the attention it deserves.
Part I of the Article considers why it makes sense to impose
obligations on lawyers at the retainer stage of representation.13 Part
II describes the current regulatory scheme. Part III sets forth this
Article's view of the appropriate contours of lawyers' obligations,
Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIz. L. REV.
829, 838-40 (2002) [hereinafter Zacharias, Confronting Lies] (discussing the "fiction" that all
lawyers are competent).
9. In other words, enabling lawyers to take matters beyond their current expertise allows
members of the bar, particularly new and inexperienced attorneys, to expand their practices.
10. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2 (2006) (regulating lawyer
advertising); id. R. 7.3 (regulating solicitation of clients).
11. See Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching: Legal Advertising
as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 1003-
04 (2002) [hereinafter Zacharias, What Lawyers Do] (noting that advertising rules are rarely
enforced, in part because the regulators focus more on lawyers' actions that actually harm
clients).
12. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
13. This Article limits itself to the obligations of lawyers. It does not focus or depend on
the argument that lawyers are unique, though some observers (particularly judges and
practitioners) have taken that position. The Article also does not address whether and how
contracts with doctors, psychologists, and other professionals, who share some characteristics
with lawyers, should be regulated.
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either under a refined interpretation of existing law or through
amendments to the professional standards. Finally, Part IV exam-
ines the significance of defining a lawyer's preemployment role for
the legal ethics regime and for external law regulating the bar. Part
IV tentatively offers several options, some designed to enhance
enforcement of lawyers' preemployment obligations and others
that might serve as independent alternatives for achieving client
protection.
I. Do CLIENTS NEED REGULATORY PROTECTION AT THE RETAINER
STAGE OF REPRESENTATION?
Before examining the current regulatory scheme and considering
its amendment, it is worth considering why regulation might even
be contemplated. The answer to that question turns on two factors:
(1) the importance to clients of making good decisions and receiving
the assistance of objective legal advice at the preemployment stage
of representation; and (2) the reasons why consumers of legal
services might be prone to poor decision making in the absence of
their prospective lawyers' help. The following sections address each
factor in turn.
A. Clients' Stake in Lawyers'Approaches to Their Preemployment
Role
In discussing lawyers' obligations when setting fees, the Restate-
ment of the Law Governing Lawyers distinguishes between
sophisticated and unsophisticated clients.14 That distinction may be
insufficiently nuanced. Clients can be sophisticated-in other words,
intelligent and worldly-without truly grasping what lawyers do,
how they operate, and when they are needed. Other clients may
know and understand the pertinent information, but still not be in
a position to act on their knowledge.
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b (2000) (noting
that "[c]ourts are concerned to protect clients, particularly those who are unsophisticated in
matters of lawyers' compensation"). But see STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 35 (7th ed. 2005) (arguing that the Restatement inadequately
protects unsophisticated clients in fee discussions).
[Vol. 49:569576
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Prospective clients can be categorized in one of the following five
ways, with each category reflecting the clients' need for protection
against bad decision making at the retainer stage. Most vulnerable
are potential clients who are completely unsophisticated. Next come
intelligent potential clients, but those who have had no experience
with lawyers. The middle group consists of potential clients of
reasonable intelligence who have had some legal experience, but
who simply have no way of identifying alternative representation.
Repeat clients probably require somewhat less protection because
they at least have specific experience with a particular lawyer,
which gives them some feel for the lawyer's qualities. 5 Needing the
least protection are highly sophisticated clients who have both the
knowledge and wherewithal to select the best lawyer for a particular
matter, such as corporate clients who rely on in-house counsel to
select outside representation.
Just as there is a range of prospective clients, there is a range of
matters about which clients need information before hiring a
particular lawyer. A consulted lawyer often will have personal in-
centives not to address a prospective client's lack of information
because the client's focus on the information may cause her to seek
representation elsewhere or not to seek legal representation at all. 6
Initially, it is important for prospective clients to know whether
it is necessary, or wise, to hire a lawyer (or a particular type of
lawyer). This issue encompasses several considerations. The merits
of the client's position may determine whether the matter is worth
pursuing. Alternatively, the case may call for the prospective client
to employ a strategy for which no lawyer is necessary or that some
lawyers are not qualified to implement. For example, although a
client initially may believe that litigation is imminent or necessary,
the consulted lawyer may realize that mediation, arbitration, or
immediate settlement is the wiser approach. As a practical
matter, however, a consulted lawyer may not always have sufficient
15. Of course, even these clients may not realize that a difference in subject matter might
significantly affect a lawyer's competence or suitability for the case. They also may have
misperceived the lawyer's competence in the first matter.
16. To avoid confusion, this Article refers to the consulted lawyer as male and to other
actors in the process, such as judges and clients, as female.
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information at the retainer stage to advise the client regarding all
the considerations pertinent to the decision of how best to proceed.
To be valuable, part of the preemployment discussion also should
address the threshold issue of what the representation will, and
ought to, include. In some situations, a client is well advised to use
a particular lawyer for limited purposes, leaving other aspects of the
potential representation to another lawyer, a non-lawyer service
provider, or pro se representation. 7 Unbundling of legal services is
becoming ever more common and viable.'" When realistic, the
possibility of unbundling is an eventuality lawyers might be
expected to discuss honestly with clients at the outset of representa-
tion, even though lawyers' self-interest may lie in convincing
prospective clients to engage full legal representation for all related
matters.
Once a potential client determines that she should hire some
lawyer, she confronts two broad questions: is this the best lawyer
for the job and is this the best lawyer for the price the lawyer
proposes to charge? Obviously, these questions are not absolute.
Compromising on the two issues in a reasonable way may well be
necessary in order to obtain suitable counsel.
17. See, e.g., Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 570, 571 (1983) (characterizing the bundling of legal services as inefficient); Robert B.
Yegge, Divorce Litigants Without Lawyers, 28 FAM. L.Q. 407, 408 (1994) (noting the "new
reality" of pro se divorce representation).
18. See, e.g., FORREST S. MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE TO DELIVERING
LEGAL SERVICES A LA CARTE 105 (2000) (arguing that unbundling is "practiced by lawyers with
solid reputations in many fields of practice"); Steven K. Berenson, Cloak for the Bare: In
Support of Allowing Prospective Malpractice Liability Waivers in Certain Pro Bono Cases, 29
J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 1 (2005) ("Substantial strides have been made in the effort to increase access
to justice for poor persons in areas such as ... 'unbundling' legal services .... "); Russell Engler,
And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges,
Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2005 (1999) (noting that "the concept [of
unbundling] has attracted increased attention"); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, And Such
Small Portions: Limited Performance Agreements and the Cost/Quality/Access Trade-Off, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 959, 978 (1998) (advocating "routine unbundling and 'deskilling' of legal
services"); Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and Moderate-
Income Elderly Clients, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 339 (1997) (noting that "[i]n time,
discrete-task representation may be a practical alternative for providing legal assistance to
the moderate-income elderly," but urging caution); Marcus J. Lock, Comment, Increasing
Access to Justice: Expanding the Role of Nonlawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-
Income Coloradans, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 459, 484-88 (2001) (discussing the adoption of
Colorado rules facilitating unbundling).
578 [Vol. 49:569
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What goes into the determination of whether this is the best
lawyer for the matter? Typically, a lawyer's suitability depends
upon three factors: his general ability (including his native ability
and legal skills), his general experience, and his specific experience
handling this type of case. Prospective clients rarely can expect to
retain the very best lawyer for a particular matter, even if that
single person could be identified. But there are lawyers who fit
within a range of suitability that consumers of legal services should
be able to identify.
Whether a particular lawyer is the best lawyer for the price he
proposes to charge is a more complicated calculation. Because the
factors comprising competence are variable, clients inevitably will
find it difficult to price lawyers' relative worth. There are several
pertinent pieces of information, however, that a well-informed
prospective client might expect a straightforward lawyer to provide.
First, a prospective client arguably would expect the lawyer to
alert the client to the availability of free representation for someone
in the client's position-be it a public defender, legal aid, or public
interest organizations. Second, the prospective client probably
would expect the lawyer to-and might even be legally entitled to
have the lawyer-accurately identify the availability of true
specialists in the subject matter at issue, the degree of the lawyer's
own expertise, and (if the lawyer is not a specialist) the identity of
lawyers who can provide specialist services.' 9 In light of the failure
of most jurisdictions to certify true specialists in an official way,2°
19. The comments to Model Rule 1.1 limit the cases lawyers can accept to those in which
they are, or can make themselves, competent. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1
cmts. 1-6 (2006). Arguably, a lawyer's limited experience is something a client should know
in order to make decisions in the matter, and therefore must be communicated to the client
under Model Rule 1.4. See id. R. 1.4 (requiring the lawyer to provide explanations that allow
the client to make informed decisions); cf. Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller, & Keefe, 291
N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980) (holding lawyer responsible for failing to advise client to have
an expert evaluate the matter in light of lawyer's own lack of expertise). At least one court has
found a legal duty on a lawyer's part to refer a matter in which he is incompetent to a
specialist. Horne v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 720 (Ct. App. 1979); see also Karen J.
Feyerherm, Recent Development, Legal Malpractice-Expansion of the Standard of Care:
Duty To Refer, 56 WASH. L. REv. 505, 507 (1981) (questioning Home). In Horne, however, the
referring attorney maintained a full attorney-client relationship with the client in the matter
in question. See Horne, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
20. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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however, it may be difficult for the lawyer to define specialists and
the fields in which specific substantive expertise is required.
In attempting to identify the best lawyer for the price, some
prospective clients will rely on a consulted lawyer to provide
referrals to better or cheaper options. Is this expectation justified?
Practical problems abound: will a lawyer be able to acknowledge to
himself that another attorney is superior; do lawyers know the
prices their competitors charge; how can lawyers develop accurate
impressions about the competition? Moreover, it may be difficult for
a lawyer to compare the services he expects to provide against the
services of a competitor because the competitor may do more or less
for the same pay. Imposing upon lawyers a referral obligation would
require them to conduct an inquiry into the market that they
otherwise might never undertake.
Suppose a prospective client has in some manner determined that
a particular lawyer is suitable and fairly priced. And suppose the
consulted lawyer has provided the minimal information that is
required under state law regarding the extent and nature of fees
and the allocation of expenses. What other information can the
client reasonably expect the lawyer to share before a retainer is
signed?
When a potential conflict of interest exists, the professional rules
require the lawyer to inform the prospective client of the advan-
tages, disadvantages, and risks of waiving the conflict.21 But the
client may have a right to receive more, namely, objective advice
regarding whether the client should, in fact, execute a waiver.22
Moreover, to the extent a lawyer provides a prospective client
with written information about conflicts, fees, and expenses, the
client often will need help in interpreting the information.23 Like
boilerplate disclaimers, information buried within a lengthy
21. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2006) (requiring informed
client consent to a waiver confirmed in writing), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.7(b)(2) (2000) (requiring a lawyer to explain "the implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved").
22. See Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts, supra note 5, at 432 (arguing that lawyers should
be required to advise clients objectively regarding waiver).
23. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Professional Responsibility,
7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 173-74 (1996) [hereinafter Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal
Distinction].
[Vol. 49:569580
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retainer agreement is likely to be overlooked by the prospective
client.24 In one sense, it may be the client's obligation to protect
herself. On the other hand, anticipating a lawyer-client trust
relationship, the prospective client arguably is justified in expecting
the lawyer to point out issues of real concern.
25
The normative decision of what obligations to impose on lawyers
to guide their clients at the preemployment stage depends, in part,
on the extent to which regulators believe potential clients can know,
judge, or investigate the above information on their own. Few, if
any, external tools exist to assist clients in investigating lawyers.26
No consumer reports on the subject exist, precisely because the
assessment is imprecise and varies with the nature of each case.
Some issues, however, are within the capacity of some potential
clients to ascertain through investigation of the market, interviews,
and probing questions. For example, sophisticated clients are
capable of determining each lawyer's education and experience,
requesting references (to the extent former clients agree to serve as
references), 27 and comparing the fees of multiple lawyers they
consult. They also can be expected to read and interpret the infor-
mation that prospective attorneys do provide regarding fees,
conflicts, and waivers. Less intelligent but motivated clients might
find it more difficult to compare the competence and experience of
competing lawyers. Nevertheless, by addressing questions to local
bar associations, these clients at a minimum should be able to
ascertain whether organizations exist that provide free or reduced-
fee services. In contrast, it may be beyond the capacity of unsophis-
ticated or inexperienced potential clients to investigate even
relatively concrete factors because they may not realize they should,
24. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 wM. &
MARY L. REV. 1303, 1367 (1995) [hereinafter Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism].
25. See, e.g., Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 607-08 (Ct. App. 1993) (suggesting
that a lawyer's duty to provide advice extends beyond the scope of the retention agreement);
Domen v. Sugarman, 54 Va. Cir. 176, 178 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (noting that a lawyer has a duty to
advise a client of steps that a client should take to protect his or her interests).
26. See infra Part I.B.3.
27. One issue that lawyers and former clients must be cautious about is the potential
waiver of attorney-client privilege or confidentiality that may occur when a former client
speaks to the potential client about the lawyer's past performance. Moreover, the lawyer must
avoid breaching confidentiality even in suggesting that he represented a former client and
that she might be willing to serve as a reference.
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may be too dependent to shop around or probe, or may not know the
questions to ask.
B. Reasons Why Prospective Clients Might Not Protect Themselves
Like all other service providers, lawyers are subject to basic
constraints in soliciting and contracting for business. They may not
commit fraud or misrepresent their abilities in a way that ulti-
mately damages the client." They must be able to perform promised
services well enough to withstand scrutiny under malpractice or
breach of contract standards.29 They may not charge unconscionable
fees. °
Beyond those constraints, the tradition of caveat emptor sug-
gests that prospective clients, like other consumers, should be
expected to protect themselves in their dealings with lawyers. Three
factors, however, provide possible justifications for imposing special
obligations on lawyers. First, the nature of legal work and the legal
profession often makes it difficult for prospective clients to identify
their own interests. Second, lawyers' clients are a peculiar type of
consumer, and only some have the tools to make appropriate
decisions. Third, the market is not effective in providing information
that enables consumers of legal services to protect themselves.
28. Only service providers who can be characterized as "fiduciaries" risk liability in the
absence of damages. See, e.g., Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Even
courts that sometimes do require a showing of injury and causation in claims seeking only
forfeiture of legal fees have stated that it is not necessary when the clients' claim is based ...
on a breach of the duty of loyalty."); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969)
(noting that a cause of action based on a breach of fiduciary duty does not require an
allegation of damages); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229,240 (Tex. 1999) (holding that a "client
need not prove actual damages in order to obtain forfeiture of an attorney's fee for the
attorney's breach of fiduciary duty to the client"); see also United States v. Carter, 217 U.S.
286, 306 (1910) (holding that "[i]t would be a dangerous precedent" to require a showing of
actual damages in breach of fiduciary duty cases).
29. See infra Part II.D.1.
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 1.5(a) (2006) (forbidding agreements for
unconscionable fees).
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1. The Nature of Lawyers, Their Work, and the Role They Have
Been Assigned
Only a small percentage of legal work is rote. A few types of
contracts are formulaic. Divorces in the absence of children or
familial assets can be routine. But most representation involves
nuance, negotiation, and predictions that do not lend themselves to
automatic resolution.
This has important consequences for consumers of legal services.
Legal representation is foreign to most prospective clients' everyday
experiences. Laypersons usually cannot determine how well a
lawyer has performed-for example, whether counsel has drafted or
negotiated a good contract-until a transaction falls apart. Indeed,
many experienced clients will never know how good or bad their
lawyer's service really was. Accordingly, consumers of legal services
will have difficulty assessing a potential lawyer's expertise on their
own and may be unable to rely on word-of-mouth reports by the
lawyer's previous clients.
The complexity of legal work also means that one cannot assume
all lawyers will perform a particular service equally well. Each piece
of legal work ordinarily can be completed in a range of ways, with
a broad range of quality. An individual lawyer's competence with
respect to each type of work also varies, in part because lawyers
often are willing to perform a spectrum of services without special-
ized training even when true specialists in the field exist." This
stands in contrast, for example, to the medical profession. Although
primary care physicians may be willing to consider treating a
range of conditions initially, as soon as specialized treatment
becomes appropriate, doctors ordinarily refer patients to a physician
specially trained and certified.
Professional regulation in most jurisdictions makes it difficult
for consumers of legal services to select among alternative lawyers
by imposing roadblocks to a lawyer's ability to claim a specialty.32
31. Such action is sanctioned by the Model Rules. See id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2.
32. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission, 496 U.S. 91,110-11 (1990), imposed limits on a bar association's ability to outlaw
specialty claims, but some jurisdictions nonetheless persist in regulating them to the extent
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Equally problematic are jurisdictions that do not regulate special-
ization claims at all, allowing self-identification by self-proclaimed
specialists;33 this approach renders lawyers' claims of expertise
dubious indicators of quality. States that try to walk the line
between over-regulation and non-regulation-for example, by re-
quiring certification before a lawyer may claim a specialty 34 -
they can. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (2006) (limiting claims of fields
of practice and specialization to lawyers who have received very specific (and sometimes
unavailable) certifications); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (2006) (limiting self-
identification as a "specialist" to attorneys who practice patent or admiralty law); see also
Adrian Evans & Clark D. Cunningham, Specialty Certification as an Incentive for Increased
Professionalism: Lessons from Other Disciplines and Countries, 54 S.C. L. REv. 987,989 (2003)
(stating that current specialty certification regulations in the United States are based on
unduly restrictive criteria, and should be widened to include high quality service to clients
and high ethical standards). Most jurisdictions that allow certification of specialists predicate
certification on the passing of an examination. See Judith Kilpatrick, Specialist Certification
for Lawyers: What Is Going On?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 273, 298 (1997) (discussing the
prevalence of specialty examinations). Typically, however, examinations are available in only
a few subject matters.
33. See, e.g., GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (2006) (allowing lawyers to
communicate specialties gained by "experience, specialized training or education" or "certified
by a recognized and bona fide professional entity," subject only to the requirement that the
communication not be false or misleading); IOWA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 32:7.4 (2005)
("A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer practices in or limits the lawyer's
practice to certain fields of law."); OR. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1(a)(4) (2006) (limiting
specialty claims only insofar as they are "false or misleading"). Many of these jurisdictions
require claims of certification to be accompanied by disclaimers that the state has not
participated in the certification process. See COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (2006)
(permitting lawyers to state that they are specialists and allowing lawyers to claim
certification as a specialist by any certifying organization, provided that the claim is
accompanied by the disclaimer that "Colorado does not certify attorneys as specialists in any
field"); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTR. 7.4 (2006) (allowing lawyers to designate themselves
as certified specialists provided the claim is accompanied by a disclaimer that the state does
not certify specialists); Mo. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 4-7.4 (2006) (allowing specialty
claims accompanied by a disclaimer of state involvement); OHIO CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105(A)(5) (2006) (allowing claims of certification by an unapproved
organization if accompanied by a disclaimer); VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4(d) (2006)
(allowing lawyers to claim certification as a specialist as long as the lawyer names the
certifying organization and provides a disclaimer stating that Virginia has no procedure for
approving certifying organizations).
34. Many jurisdictions rely exclusively on certifying organizations approved by the ABA,
which appears to evaluate specialist claims fairly stringently. There are, however, a limited
number of such organizations, and they do not certify a broad range of specialties about which
consumers might like information. See ABA Standing Committee on Specialization, Sources
of Certification, http://www.abanet.orgtlegalservices/specialization/source.html (last visited
Oct. 13, 2007) (listing seven ABA-approved certifying organizations). Indeed, in most
jurisdictions that sanction certification programs, certification in only a handful of subject
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typically fall short in practice because they rely on organizations
that certify specialists based on only superficial training or exami-
nation in the limited area.35 Thus, the three current -regulatory
regimes each, in its own way, makes it difficult for prospective
clients to identify which lawyers truly are well versed in the field
that the representation involves.
The notion that legal consumers should be able to depend on
their potential lawyers for assistance in identifying their needs
at the retainer stage is consistent with the image of lawyers that
the profession has always promoted. The professional codes are
designed to induce clients to use and trust lawyers.36 The bar has
always attempted to persuade society that the codes effectively
regulate lawyers, allowing clients to rely upon the bar's "profession-
alism";37 in other words, the profession itself has suggested that
matters is available. See ABA Standing Committee on Specialization, State Status Report on
Lawyer Specialty Certification, http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/speciaization/statestatus.
html (last visited Oct. 13, 2007) (listing certification programs in each state).
35. New Mexico, for example, directly certifies specialists, but does not require any
examination for any specialties other than civil litigation. ABA Standing Committee on
Specialization, State Status Report on Lawyer Certification, http://abanet.org/legalservices/
specialization/statestatus.htm. (last visited Oct. 13, 2007); State Bar of New Mexico,
Summary of Requirements for First Time Certification in a Specialty, http://www.nmbar.org/
template.cfm?Section=Summary..ofRequirements (last visited Oct. 13, 2007). Similarly, in
Nevada, lawyers in theory may be certified by any state-approved organization (including
ABA-approved organizations) that monitors satisfaction of objective requirements. See, e.g.,
NEv. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4(d)(1)-(d)(2)(i)-(ii), R. 7.4A(a)-(b) (2006) (allowing
certification of any lawyer who has devoted one-third of the past two years to practicing in the
specific field and has completed ten hours of continuing legal education in the designated field
in the year preceding certification). Although certifying organizations must submit any
examinations they use to the state approval body and, in practice, may rely on examinations,
the state rules do not seem to require certifying organizations to employ an examination
process. Nev. State Bar Bd. of Governors, Governing Rules for Attorney Specialization 4-5,
http://www.nvbar.orglspecialization/Exhibit%203%20governing/o20rules.doc (last visited Oct.
13, 2007).
36. See, e.g., Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 23, at 182 (discussing
the paradigm of the professional codes that "assumes a client who enters the lawyer-client
relationship so afraid or distrustful that only total partisanship, and the lawyer's promise of
total partisanship, will induce the client to trust and use counsel"); Fred C. Zacharias,
Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 361-63 (1989) [hereinafter Zacharias,
Rethinking Confidentiality] (discussing the goal of confidentiality rules as being, in part, to
induce clients to use and trust lawyers).
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, pmbl. (2006) ('CThe legal profession is largely
self-governing.... To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling,
the occasion for government regulation is obviated."); cf. Fred C. Zacharias, The Humanization
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lawyers are not ordinary, profit-maximizing businessmen and are
client-oriented in their approaches. It would be surprising if a
potential client did not begin her association with a lawyer assum-
ing that the lawyer will bring these characteristics to bear from the
outset.
Consider a hypothetical lawyer who meets with a client for the
first time. If one takes the position that the lawyer will treat the
initial consultation as an arm's-length transaction, one has to
assume that the lawyer will speak to the client differently than he
will after the contract is signed. In reality, however, lawyers
typically assure clients of confidentiality from the outset. They
make it clear that, if retained, they will be the client's ally, perhaps
even their only friend. They also effect a posture of objectivity and
professional detachment.
In the context of this conversation, how is the potential client
likely to react? Will she assume that the lawyer has two souls--one
in advising whether the client should proceed, how the client
should proceed, with whom as counsel, and at what price and the
other in advising on the merits of the case? Or will the potential
client assume that the lawyer is providing objective (though
perhaps partly self-interested) advice that serves the client's goals?
The image of professionalism fostered by the individual lawyer and
the bar as a whole induces the client into assuming a level of
professionalism that the client might not assume vis-A-vis other
service providers.
It is important to distinguish the public's general image of
lawyers from the conduct the public expects of particular lawyers
once they are consulted. The legal profession has a poor reputation,
so a prospective client/consumer may well anticipate that any
lawyer she visits will be greedy and amoral. At the same time, how-
ever, laypersons picture lawyers as aggressive and relentless in
pursuing each client's goals, because that is part of the bar's public
image as well.3" The profession has cultivated client trust, educating
of Lawyers, 2002 SYMP. ISSUE, THE PROF. LAw. 9, 28 (arguing that the bar should defer more
to outside regulation of lawyers); Fred C. Zacharias, Reform or Professional Responsibility as
Usual: Whither the Institutions of Regulation and Discipline?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1505, 1509-
14 (discussing the diminishing role of bar associations as "regulators-in-chief').
38. See Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass,
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the public that laypersons in trouble need lawyers' help and that
lawyers will serve only their interests."9 Hence, it is not anomalous
for a prospective client to view lawyers with some distrust in their
demand for high fees (i.e., lawyers are greedy), yet simultaneously
to assume that a consulted lawyer will serve her well in other
respects, even at the retainer stage.
2. The Nature of Prospective Clients
Professional regulation historically has assigned lawyers a duty
to safeguard their clients' interests, or at least to put their clients'
interests ahead of their own. Rules such as those governing conflicts
of interest and attorney-client confidentiality are premised in part
on clients' inability to understand the complicated legal system.4"
The rules designate lawyers as clients' interpreters or navigators of
the (otherwise incomprehensible) legal system.41
Prospective clients arguably have the same characteristics and
needs as enlisted clients. It is no stretch to conceptualize prospective
clients as ignorant of the law and requiring assistance in identifying
and contracting for appropriate representation. Unless one can
assume that prospective clients are fully capable of negotiating for
their representation or that they understand the need for independ-
75 CAL. L. REV. 379, 380-81 (1987) (discussing the public's conflicting opinions about, and
expectations of, lawyers).
39. See id.
40. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4 (1975)
(noting the client's incompetence "to evaluate the relevance or significance of particular
facts"); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality Constitutional?,
75 IOWA L. REV. 601, 621 (1990) ("Because clients have little hope of navigating the legal
system alone, the system imposes significant incentives for clients to give lawyers secrets.").
Such regulation views clients, particularly criminal defendants, as uneducated, ignorant of
the legal system, dependent on lawyers, and incapable of making decisions without a lawyer's
assistance. See generally David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession: A Problem of
Imputed Ends, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454, 458 (discussing paternalistic lawyer practice);
Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 23, at 182 (discussing the role of the
paradigm of the unsophisticated client in client-centered ethical regulation).
41. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1073 (1976) (stating that "without the assistance
of an expert adviser an ordinary layman cannot exercise that autonomy which the system
must allow him"); cf. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 23, at 182 (noting
that "the [criminal] paradigm assumes an unintelligent, or at least unsophisticated, client
who is unable to navigate the legal system").
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ent advice before signing retainers, the prospective lawyers seem to
be in the sole position to guide the clients.42
The reality, however, is more complex. The professional codes, for
example, refer to a second paradigm that treats clients as relatively
sophisticated individuals.43 Under some circumstances, the codes
take as a given that clients who are provided information are fully
capable of making informed, autonomous decisions.
44
Most professional rules-whether they rely on the paradigm of
clients as dependent or the paradigm of clients as sophisticated
-seem to deem all clients to be alike.45 For purposes of retainer
ethics, however, the range of clients is actually broad.46 One can
reasonably assume that sophisticated corporate clients who deal
with their attorneys through in-house counsel will evaluate their
need for representation and the qualifications of potential lawyers
relatively objectively.47 Conversely, unsophisticated, inexperienced,
and vulnerable clients who do not know how to deal with lawyers
are less likely to perceive transactions with potential counsel as
fully arm's-length transactions. 48 The majority of clients fit some-
where between these extremes.
42. See FREEDMAN, supra note 40, at 4.
43. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFVL CONDUCT R. 1.8(a), (b), (f), (g) (2006) (allowing
lawyers to take various actions when a client possesses sufficient information to make an
adequate decision).
44. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Limits on Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 199,203-14 (2001) (distinguishing among rules that accord clients
different levels of autonomy and identifying rules that accord clients autonomy once assured
clients have the requisite information to make intelligent decisions); see also Marcy Strauss,
Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C.
L. REV. 315, 336-39 (1987) (arguing for regulation allowing increased autonomy in client
decision making, based on an informed consent model).
45. See Zacharias, Confronting Lies, supra note 8, at 840-41 (discussing the tendency of
professional codes to treat all clients as identical).
46. See supra text accompanying note 15; cf. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction,
supra note 23, at 173-74 (discussing variations in client sophistication).
47. Cf. Stephen Gillers, Caveat Client: How the Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers Fails to Protect Unsophisticated Consumers in Fee Agreements
with Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 581,608 (1997) (discussing ways sophisticated clients
evaluate lawyers' fees and fee proposals); see also id. at 609 n.125.
48. See id. at 587 (arguing that the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers proposal
regarding attorney-client fee arrangements 'leaves unsophisticated consumers of legal
services inadequately protected" and that strict written disclosure rules should be required).
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This background makes it possible to consider whether consum-
ers of legal services, provided only with their potential lawyers'
representations, can safeguard their own interests. Two characteris-
tics of prospective clients support the notion that they require
regulatory protection. First, many prospective clients suffer from
psychological disabilities that do not impede purchasers of other
types of services. Second, at least some potential clients perceive
lawyers (and the regulation of lawyers) to be unique and reasonably
rely on the prospective lawyers for objective advice.
The history of legal advertising rules suggests that the regulating
institutions have always presumed consumers of legal services to be
psychologically incapable of interpreting lawyers' representations
about their qualifications. Before the Supreme Court intervened,
legal ethics codes banned all legal advertising.49 Thereafter, the
ABA and all American jurisdictions continued to ban "misleading
advertisements."5 ° Many states have fleshed out this notion, con-
cluding that consumers of legal services cannot adequately evaluate
dramatizations, testimonials, claims of relative competence based
on past performance, or even well-intentioned references from past
clients.5 The asserted justifications for such regulation are that all
49. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (holding
unconstitutional absolute prohibitions on advertising); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350,383 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a full ban on legal advertising). See generally LOUISE
L. HILL, LAWYER ADVERTISING (1993) (describing the history of legal advertising regulation);
Fred C. Zacharias, What Direction Should Legal Advertising Regulation Take, 2005 SYMP.
ISSUE, THE PROF. LAW. 45, 46 [hereinafter Zacharias, Legal Advertising] ("When the Supreme
Court held a total ban unconstitutional, the bar continued to enforce slightly less prohibitive
regulation, but the Supreme Court consistently found these efforts to be overreaching as well."
(footnotes omitted)).
50. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 7.1 cmt. 3 (2006); see also In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (disapproving absolute bans on targeted advertisements, but
upholding prohibitions against misleading advertising); Zacharias, What Lawyers Do, supra
note 11, at 988-95 (cataloguing state advertising regulations).
51. Many of these state regulations are described in Zacharias, Legal Advertising, supra
note 49, at 47 nn.10-12. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6157.2(c)(2), 6158.1(b) (West
2005) (creating a rule that dramatizations must have disclaimers and a rebuttable
presumption that advertising using past results or dramatizations is misleading); ARK. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(e) (2007) (prohibiting the use of dramatizations as well as former
and current clients in advertisements); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-400 Standards
(2), (13) (2006) (requiring dramatizations and testimonials in advertisements to have
disclaimers); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 4-7.2(b) (2005) (prohibiting the use of past
results, testimonials, and some dramatizations); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(a)
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legal matters are unique, that laypersons will draw unwarranted
inferences from past results, and that potential clients are too likely
to trust lawyers' statements.
These assumptions about potential clients' psychological inability
to protect their own interests reappear in other professional rules,
such as those governing conflicts of interest and transactions with
clients, which require lawyers to give prospective clients warnings
before accepting client waivers.53 Similarly, the traditional designa-
tion of lawyers as fiduciaries rests on a belief that clients of all
stripes are unusually dependent on lawyers, in part because they
reveal confidences to the lawyers.54 The common image is that
laypersons trust lawyers to look after their interests, are vulnerable
in their transactions with lawyers, and are hesitant to discharge
counsel or to shop around once having consulted an attorney.55
The psychology extends further, however. Laypersons visiting
lawyers for the first time typically approach them with a different
(2004) (prohibiting dramatizations in advertisements); PA. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCTR. 7.2(g)
(2005) (requiring disclaimers for dramatizations).
52. See, e.g., D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 1 (2007) (stating that client
endorsements are likely to create unjustifiable expectations); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 4-7.2 cmt. (2006) (stating that testimonials are prohibited because potential clients are
likely to draw the conclusion from a testimonial that the lawyer will get the same results in
their cases); Frederick C. Moss, The Ethics of Law Practice Marketing, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 601, 621 (1986) (noting that prohibitions against the use of testimonials are typically
based on an assumption about the public's naivet6).
53. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2006) (requiring lawyers to
obtain informed consent, confirmed in writing, for a conflict waiver); id. R. 1.8(a)(1) (requiring
disclosures preceding a transaction with a client).
54. See, e.g., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1994)
(stating that lawyers occupy a "unique position of trust and confidence" vis-i-vis clients);
Goldman v. Kane, 329 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975) (implementing fiduciary duty
principles to create a presumption that a lawyer's business transaction with a client was
improper even though the lawyer had advised the client not to engage in the transaction); see
also GILLERS, supra note 14, at 63 (identifying reasons supporting the imposition of fiduciary
obligations on attorneys).
55. Thus, for example, some courts have gone so far as to find that lawyers breached their
fiduciary duty by engaging in sexual relations with their clients, even when the clients
initiated or insisted on the encounter. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof. Ethics and Conduct of the
Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Hill, 436 N.W.2d 57, 58-59 (Iowa 1989) (disciplining a lawyer despite
the fact that the client solicited the lawyer and the lawyer initially demurred); cf. Brickman,
supra note 6, at 65 (assuming that most personal injury claimants are "not legally
sophisticated and do not have access to legal counsel to evaluate the proposed contingent fee
retainer agreement").
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mindset than when consumers approach other service providers.
Although most potential clients recognize that lawyers, like plumb-
ers, plan to make a living, many perceive lawyers as "professionals"
rather than profit maximizers. That is especially true of those
potential clients who start from a position of dependence or
vulnerability, either because of the threat of a cataclysmic event
that they have not experienced in the past (such as a lawsuit or
criminal prosecution) or because they are involved in an emotional
legal matter (such as a divorce). These individuals tend to view
lawyers, at least in part, as a "friend""M or immediate ally.5"
This perception is bolstered by the public's assumption that
lawyers are specially regulated, in a way that prevents lawyers from
taking advantage of clients. Prospective clients' confidence in the
lawyers they meet is reinforced when the lawyers promise to keep
the potential clients' secrets and to be on their side." It is in part for
these reasons that the designation of lawyers as fiduciaries initially
arose.
5 9
56. See generally Fried, supra note 41, at 1060 (developing a theory of the lawyer as
"friend" of the client).
57. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 7-8 (3d
ed. 2004) (arguing that the "central concern of lawyers' ethics is ... how far we can ethically
go ... to achieve for our clients full and equal rights under law").
58. At least two states encourage this perspective by requiring or encouraging lawyers (or
groups of lawyers) to provide clients with a "Client Bill of Rights" at the outset of the
representation. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1210.1 (2001) (requiring New York
lawyers to post a bill of rights prominently); Doris B. Truhlar et al., Committee Writes Clients'
Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, COLO. LAW., Feb. 2002, at 21 (describing proposed Clients'
Bill of Rights and Responsibilities to be provided by matrimonial lawyers in Colorado); see
also Patrick M. Connors, Professional Responsibility, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 793, 811 (1998)
(noting that the justification for New York's Client Bill of Rights is that it "helps to instill
confidence in lawyers and provides each law office with an opportunity to advertise the high
standards of practice guaranteed to each client"); Anna Snider, Firms Put Client Bill ofRights
on Display, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 31, 1997, at 1 (describing the New York Client Bill of Rights).
59. See Konover Dev. Corp. v. Zeller, 635 A.2d 798, 805 (Conn. 1994) ("[A] 'fiduciary or
confidential relationship is characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between
the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is under a duty to
represent the interests of the other."' (quoting Dunham v. Dunham, 528 A.2d 1123, 1134
(Conn. 1987))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (2000) ("A
lawyer is a fiduciary, that is, a person to whom another person's affairs are entrusted in
circumstances that often make it difficult or undesirable for that other person to supervise
closely the performance of the fiduciary."); cf. Brickman, supra note 5, at 1209 ("Most clients
lack sufficient information upon which to base an informed judgment regarding the fee
structure and hence must rely on their lawyer for that knowledge.").
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These expectations of some (but, of course, not all) potential
clients do not mean that lawyers should be forbidden to profit from
plying their trade. Even trustees are entitled to a reasonable fee for
their services. 0 Existing regulations limiting lawyers to reasonable
fees protect clients from overreaching in that regard. 1 However,
the distinct psychological attributes of potential clients and their
reasonable perceptions when entering upon representation may call
for more than simple fee regulation. At least some prospective
clients require help evaluating the need for representation, the form
it should take, and who can best supply it-help that perhaps only
the initial lawyer can provide.
3. Does the Market Enable Lawyers' Potential Clients To Protect
Themselves?
The issues just described would largely disappear if prospective
clients could easily obtain the information they need and under-
stand it before visiting counsel. Certainly, not all clients suffer from
psychological impediments to evaluating potential representatives.
Nevertheless, the market for legal services itself imposes barriers
to the informed selection of an appropriate lawyer.
The main way the market provides information to potential
clients is through lawyers' reputations. An important issue,
therefore, is what type of reputational information actually is of
value to prospective clients. As a practical matter, reputation
ordinarily focuses on a lawyer's general, or relative, competence; in
other words, whether the lawyer is "good." Yet, as already noted, a
prospective client often needs more specific information about the
lawyer's expertise in matters like the client's matter, about the
lawyer's fees relative to those of other lawyers, and about the
60. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 38(1) (2003) ("A trustee is entitled
to reasonable compensation out of the trust estate for services as trustee, unless the terms
of the trust provide otherwise or the trustee agrees to forgo compensation."); MARY F.
RADFORD ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 975 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that trustees
are entitled to reasonable compensation).
61. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2006) (forbidding lawyers to
charge an "unreasonable fee").
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availability of alternative services such as mediation or free legal
representation. 2
Equally significant, a lawyer's reputation may vary in different
circles and among different types of clients. A lawyer may be well
regarded among attorneys and judges based on his professionalism.
But potential clients might well prefer (or require) a less "profes-
sional" or "civil" lawyer-one who is highly aggressive and cuts
corners. Only if the consumer knows to ask the right questions will
a report about reputation help her obtain appropriate counsel.
It is difficult for most clients to identify the best lawyer for a
particular legal matter, but the level of difficulty varies depending
on the nature of the client. Lawyer-savvy clients-ones who use
lawyers regularly and understand their differences-find it easier
to analyze reputations and investigate representation than even
intelligent, yet inexperienced clients.63 Conversely, unsophisticated
clients may not recognize that there are differences among lawyers
at all.
To the extent that potential clients do rely on the market to
identify lawyers, they often desire lawyers who, according to some
grapevine, have been successful in the past. Yet clients often will
have a hard time accurately identifying a lawyer's past perfor-
mance, for a variety of reasons.
First, the potential client may hesitate to speak with others about
the need for a particular type of lawyer for fear of revealing
sensitive or confidential information. If a potential client does seek
to take advantage of word of mouth, her legal matter often cannot
be compared generically to a lawyer's past cases, even when the
work is in the same field.64
62. See supra Part I.A.
63. See Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, supra note 23, at 173-74.
64. See, e.g., ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 7.1 cmt. 1 (2006) (stating that an
attorney's work for previous clients cannot be compared without reference to specific factual
and legal circumstances); COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. (2006) (stating that
factually unsubstantiated results obtained for previous clients are likely to mislead potential
clients); Daniel M. Filler, Lawyers in the Yellow Pages, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 169, 179 (2002)
(arguing that clients cannot properly compare legal work because the nature of each case
differs).
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Second, legal advertising regulation forbids lawyers themselves
to establish their worth by pointing to previous successes.65 Some
jurisdictions also restrict the word-of-mouth grapevine, forbidding
lawyers to provide testimonials from past clients" and limiting the
types of information lawyers may give potential clients about
themselves. 7
Third, public information about potential lawyers is limited.
Regulation restricts the identification of specialists." Bar referral
services typically do not evaluate lawyers' qualifications carefully
before placing them in the referral pool.69 Publications that list
65. See, e.g., ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 1 (2006) (prohibiting advertising
of previous results because such advertising can create unjustified expectations); FLA. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.2(b)(1)(B) (2005) (prohibiting references to past results).
66. See, e.g., ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1(d) (2006) (stating that a
communication is false or misleading if it contains a testimonial or endorsement); CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6158.1 (West 2005) (establishing a rebuttable presumption that
advertisements of past performance are false, misleading, or deceptive); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-101(c)(1) (2007) (precluding advertisements from containing an
endorsement or testimonial about a lawyer from a current client); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.02 cmt. 4 (2007) (prohibiting testimonials from past clients); WYO.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1(d) (2006) (stating that a communication containing a
testimonial or endorsement is false or misleading).
67. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-400(D)(6) (2006) (limiting when an
attorney can inform clients he is a certified specialist); COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
7.1 cmt. (1998) (forbidding characterizations of attorney's skills that cannot be factually
substantiated and statements of past results); IND. RULES. OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 7.2(b) (2005)
(forbidding self-laudatory statements); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1(a)(4) (2004)
(limiting the advertisement of fees); OHIO CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)(1)
(2003) (forbidding self-laudatory statements).
68. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Of course, the degree to which bar
associations may restrict a lawyer's claims of specialization has been significantly limited by
the Supreme Court's decision in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission,
496 U.S. 91 (1990).
69. For example, in California, the San Diego County Bar Association offers referrals to
attorneys in thirty-nine different areas of law. San Diego County Bar Association Lawyer
Referral & Information Service, Referral Request Form, http://www.sdcba.org(LRIS/form.
html (last visited Oct. 13, 2007). Before an attorney is listed, the lawyer must request the
listing and submit references. A board then verifies that the attorney is in good standing and
has experience in the specific area of law. Telephone Interview by Wayne Lo with Monica
Gomez, Counselor, San Diego County Bar Ass'n Lawyer Referral & Info. Serv., in San Diego,
Cal. (June 9, 2006).
The Los Angeles County Bar Association offers referrals to attorneys in twenty-five large
categories of law. LABCA Lawyer Referral Service, Select Type of Lawyer, http:/Ilris.lacba.
org/vlris/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 13, 2007). Los Angeles County's Lawyer Referral and
Information Service, however, lists attorneys specializing in 168 specific areas of law. To be
listed, an attorney must be in good standing and must submit professional references with the
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lawyers, such as the Yellow Pages, Martindale-Hubbell, and mem-
bership rolls of lawyer organizations usually allow lawyers to
self-select or self-identify their expertise.7"
All of this renders an interview process, including reference
checking, as the only viable method for evaluating potential counsel.
The process itself has costs, particularly if a lawyer charges for his
participation in it. More importantly, though, for the psychological
reasons identified above, 71 only the most sophisticated and experi-
enced clients, such as corporations represented by in-house counsel,
are likely to undertake this form of investigation.
It is fair to conclude that the market-including reputational
information that signals whom clients should hire and the legal
remedies for a lawyer's failure to perform adequately--does not
result in appropriate lawyer-client relationships by itself. Under
an arm's-length regime, one cannot be confident that prospective
clients will make reasonable choices. One also cannot rely on
prospective lawyers to protect consumers' interests naturally,
because lawyers' and clients' interests at this stage diverge.72
Even if market remedies were adequate, they would only provide
remedies interstitially; in other words, occasionally and after
damage has been done.
application. Applications are usually handled by administrative personnel, and go before a
committee only if issues arise. Telephone Interview by Wayne Lo with Alan Rodriguez,
Supervisor, L.A. County Bar Ass'n Lawyer Referral and Info. Serv., in San Diego, Cal. (June
9, 2006).
In San Francisco, attorneys may join eighteen different panels specializing in different
areas of law. Join the Lawyer Referral Network at BASF, http://www.sfbar.org
lawyerreferrals/ att-join.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2007). Each area has its own requirements.
An attorney must have handled a required number of cases in the specific area of law in the
recent past. Additionally, attorneys must submit professional references and be in good
standing with the California Bar Association. A committee reviews and makes decisions on
applications. Telephone Interview with Chris Cohade, Supervisor, Bar Ass'n of S.F. Lawyer
Referral and Info. Serv., in San Diego, Cal. (June 12, 2006).
70. Cf. LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell, Peer Review Ratings-Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.martindale.com/xp/Martindale/Peer-Review- Ratings/ratingsfaqs.xml
(last visited Oct. 13, 2007) (noting that Martindale-Hubbell initiates most ratings reviews, but
that a "lawyer, partner, marketing director or colleague can also request a Peer Review
Rating review").
71. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
72. In other words, the lawyer's interest is in obtaining the client and maximizing the
fees. The client's interest is in determining whether this lawyer is the best to hire and in
minimizing the fees.
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On the other hand, it is undebatable that some clients can
understand the nature of the services they seek and how to go about
determining the best representatives. One response to the failure of
the market therefore might be that the status quo is the best one
can hope for-that additional regulation cannot solve the problem
or that it will not be worth the costs. This response necessarily
rests on one of several empirically untested conclusions: that (1) the
costs of limited information to potential clients is not high, (2)
additional regulation will be ineffective in producing information, or
(3) the systemic costs of providing additional information, through
regulation or otherwise, are relatively significant.
As a theoretical matter at least, the first claim seems unlikely.
Lawyers probably are not fungible in the services they provide. In
the absence of protective regulation or a working market that
provides consumers with meaningful reputation information, one
can expect many consumers to make poor choices.
As to the second contention, how effective new regulation can be
in enhancing prospective clients' decision making depends on the
nature of the regulation and its enforcement. If regulation simply
requires lawyers to provide information, self-interested lawyers
arguably will find a way to cast the information in terms favorable
to them or will ignore the rules. Nevertheless, it is likely that at
least some lawyers are guided by the letter and spirit of professional
regulation. If instructed that their obligations include educating
prospective clients about their options, they will obey.
The relative costs of further regulation present the most difficult
of the three untested empirical issues. Obviously, the potential costs
of providing information or new protections for prospective clients
would require regulators to reach a balance between appropriate
regulation and maintaining the status quo. Part IV of this Article
will discuss some of these costs (including the likely effects on the
profession and the availability of legal services), as well as alterna-
tives the profession might pursue if the regulators decline to
strengthen the professional rules. At a minimum, however, the
above analysis illustrates that there is a real need on the part of
prospective clients, which regulators ought to take into account.
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II. THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME
The legal ethics codes include only a few explicit regulations of
lawyer activity at the retainer stage of representation. Some rules
governing conflicts of interest contain language that might give rise
to a broad obligation to advise clients fully. In practice, however, the
profession has assumed that the codes allow lawyers to treat the
retainer stage as an arm's-length negotiation.
A. The Status Quo
Under the pre-2002 Model Rules, which remain in force in many
jurisdictions, a lawyer "shall not represent a client if the representa-
tion of that client may be materially limited ... by the lawyer's own
interests," unless the client is fully informed of the advantages and
risks of waiving the conflict and the lawyer believes the representa-
tion will not be adversely affected. 3 The post-2002 Model Rules are
a bit less stringent. They identify a concurrent conflict when "there
is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited ... by a personal interest of the lawyer."74
Under both conflict rules, the issue for purposes of this Article's
subject is whether "representation" includes the retainer negotia-
tion.7"
The code drafters always have assumed that lawyers represent
prospective clients at least for the limited purpose of determining
whether a full attorney-client relationship should be consum-
mated.76 Courts, for the most part, have agreed with that proposi-
tion.77 Accordingly, some obligations do run from a lawyer to a
73. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1999).
74. MODEL RULES OF PROFVL CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2006).
75. The ABA's original 1908 code made it clear that lawyers had at least some obligation
to protect clients at the retainer stage. It provided, in pertinent part: "It is the duty of a
lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all circumstances of his relations to the
parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the
client in the selection of counsel." CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 6 (1908) (emphasis added).
76. This assumption finally was codified in MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18
(2006).
77. See, e.g., Miller v. Metzinger, 154 Cal. Rptr. 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding that a
prima facie attorney-client relationship is established when a prospective client seeks advice
from attorney); Herbes v. Graham, 536 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (finding an
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prospective client, including a duty of confidentiality and a duty to
preserve some of the prospective client's rights.78 It nevertheless is
unclear whether the basic conflict of interest precept envisions the
retainer stage as encompassing full "representation." The conflict
principle also is ambiguous on the extent to which lawyers have a
duty to explain how personal interests might affect their advice at
the retainer stage, because at some level any fee negotiation
encompasses a conflict of interests.79
In practice, lawyers typically view the retainer stage as an
opportunity to sell themselves and garner business. They may
discuss whether the client needs legal representation and the
client's options, as well as the cost of retaining the lawyer to pursue
those options. Lawyers who decide not to accept particular cases
sometimes refer the prospective clients elsewhere. But lawyers
rarely discuss the possibility that another lawyer or legal organiza-
tion may provide better or cheaper services, or the possibility that
a form of representation they do not handle might be a better
alternative than hiring them.8°
attorney-client relationship established even though the attorney eventually declined the
representation); Bays v. Theran, 639 N.E.2d 720, 723-24 (Mass. 1994) (holding that an
attorney-client relationship can be formed even if no fee is paid and prospective client does
not hire the attorney); Herbert v. Haytaian, 678 A.2d 1183, 1187-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996) (holding that consultations for the purpose of determining whether to hire an attorney
form an attorney-client relationship even in the absence of payment of a fee or eventual
retention of the attorney).
78. See, e.g., MODELRULESOFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 1.18(b) (2006) (safeguarding prospective
clients' secrets); id. R. 1.18(c)-(d) (safeguarding prospective clients against conflicts of
interest).
79. The current model conflict of interest rule is unclear, but it does note that a lawyer
"shall not represent a client" unless its prerequisites are satisfied. Id. R. 1.7. Thus, the fairest
reading of the rule is that it imposes obligations on the lawyer that arise before the lawyer
may sign an agreement to represent the potential client.
80. Some courts, in passing, have assumed that these practices are appropriate because,
in their view, retainer negotiations should be deemed arm's-length transactions. See, e.g.,
Baron v. Mare, 120 Cal. Rptr. 675, 679 (Ct. App. 1975) ("A lawyer legitimately may bargain
with a prospective client and deal at arm's length in entering into a contract of employment.");
Potter v. Daily, 40 N.E.2d 339, 345 (Ind. 1942) ('[I]n the matter of fixing and agreeing upon
the amount of appellees' fees the appellant was not relying on the appellees but was dealing
at arm's length with them. This was not such a confidential relationship .... ); Dockery v.
McLellan, 67 N.W. 733, 736 (Wis. 1896) ("Before an attorney undertakes the business of his
client, he may contract with reference to his services and the amount of his compensation ...
because no confidential relation then exists, and the parties deal with each other at arm's
length ...."); see also authorities cited supra note 4.
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The professional codes do require lawyers to provide some
information to prospective clients in writing. For example, the
Model Rules encourage written retainer agreements that make clear
"[t]he scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and
expenses for which the client will be responsible."81 Some jurisdic-
tions explicitly require that particular forms of agreement, most
notably contingency agreements, be reduced to writing and that the
terms be fully explained." Other rules forbid or limit particular
types of arrangements with clients, including payment through the
assignment of media rights to an attorney, 3 payments by third
parties,' and business transactions with the client.8 5 Still others
regulate the size of fees directly.8" But none of these rules go to the
issue addressed here, because they at most require lawyers to
explain and constrain fees. They do not require discussion or advice
concerning other matters that a client might wish (or need) to know
before making an intelligent decision about whether to engage the
lawyer.
The details of the common law regulatory scheme are discussed
below,87 but it is important to note at this point that the common
law is just as ambiguous as the professional codes on the issue of
lawyers' preemployment obligations. Unconscionability and fraud
standards govern the size of fees lawyers can charge. Judicial
decisions, however, have been unclear about whether lawyers have
additional obligations to provide clients with objective advice on the
wisdom of entering into retainer agreements. 8 The courts for the
most part have remained silent or sent mixed signals about other
duties lawyers might have at the retainer stage.
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 1.5(b) (2006).
82. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6147 (West 2003).
83. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.8(d) (2006) (forbidding a lawyer to
acquire media rights before the "conclusion of representation").
84. See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(f) (regulating third-party payments).
85. See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(a) (regulating business transactions with clients).
86. See, e.g., id. R. 1.5(a) (forbidding agreements for "an unreasonable fee").
87. See infra Part I.D.
88. See infra Part II.D.2.
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B. The Conflicting Assumptions of the Professional Codes
The above description of the codes and common law highlights
what the current standards do not say. But the description does not
resolve the question of what obligations the professional codes and
other regulation of lawyers mean to impose. Nor does it tell us what
obligations should be imposed in the absence of any clear regulatory
intent.
The professional codes' advertising and solicitation rules are all
premised on the assumption that potential clients are limited in
their ability to interpret or act upon what lawyers say when selling
their services. 9 The rules initially constrained lawyer advertising
dramatically and only recently (and as a result of constitutional
litigation) have allowed much advertising at all.9° Even today,
however, the codes caution against "misleading" advertising,9 which
many states take to mean far more than simply false, inaccurate, or
fraudulent advertising.92 Rather, these states assume that potential
clients are unable to assess even advertising that is typical in other
fields, including testimonials and dramatizations.93 Similarly,
lawyer solicitation rules continue to assume that many potential
clients are psychologically vulnerable and incapable of resisting a
lawyer's attempt to convince them to retain the lawyer's services.94
89. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2006).
92. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6158.1 (West 2005) (establishing a rebuttable
presumption that advertising of past performance, dramatizations, and amounts recovered
is misleading); FiA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.2(b)(1) (2005) (providingthat misleading
advertising includes testimonials and dramatizations); TEX. DIscIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 7.02(a) (2007) (providing that advertising of past results without adequate
information and portrayals by actors are misleading); WIS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
20:7.1 (2004) (providing that paid testimonials and comparisons with other attorneys that
cannot be factually substantiated are misleading).
93. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. (2006) (noting the potential for
abuse inherent in direct solicitation of prospective clients); ARIZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 7.3 cmt. 1 (2003) (noting that direct solicitation of clients is fraught with the possibility of
abuse due to a lawyer's training and the client's circumstances); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4-7.4 cmt. (2005) (suggesting that prospective clients are vulnerable due to the
situations giving rise to the need for legal services); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L
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There is a contradiction within legal ethics regulation, however.
Advertising (and even solicitation) rules are rarely enforced.9" The
common law also fails to deter violations, because the legal remedies
for lawyer malfeasance look at the competence or nature of the
services a lawyer ultimately provides, not the manner in which he
obtained the business in the first place. One can reasonably draw
either of two opposite conclusions from the current state of advertis-
ing and solicitation regulation: (1) the existence of the prohibitive
standards means that the regulators believe clients need protection
from lawyers seeking employment; or (2) the failure to enforce the
standards means that protections against incompetence adequately
protect clients from harm, and that it matters not how the represen-
tation commenced.
The same contradiction is inherent in the regulation of lawyers'
fees. On the one hand, both the codes and common law insist that
lawyers may only charge "reasonable fees."96 This implies that
potential clients need regulatory protection from lawyer overreach-
ing." On the other hand, courts have characterized fee agreements
as arm's-length transactions, which suggests the contrary.98
CONDUCT R. 7.03 cmt. 1 (2007) (stating that direct solicitation of clients involves well-known
opportunities for abuse).
95. See generally Zacharias, What Lawyers Do, supra note 11 (providing an empirical
analysis of the enforcement of advertising rules).
96. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2006) (forbidding the charging
of unreasonable fees); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34
(2000) ("A lawyer may not charge a fee larger than is reasonable in the circumstances or that
is prohibited by law.").
97. See, e.g., Walton v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, LLP, 149 S.W.3d 834, 847 (Tex. App.
2004) (stating that even an informed client is without power to ratify an unconscionable fee
agreement because the agreement "violates public policy").
98. See, e.g., King v. Fox, 851 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (N.Y. 2006) (suggesting that adequately
informed clients may be competent to ratify even unconscionable fees); Brickman, supra note
6, at 55 ("[It is a widely held view that fee contracts ... are irrebuttably presumed to be arm's
length transactions, governed by contract and not by fiduciary law.").
Indeed, some states have adopted statutes, modeled on the 1848 Field Code, which provide
that compensation of attorneys is governed by the contract agreed upon, and is not "restrained
by law." Id. at 36, 37 nn.26-27 (citing state statutes and quoting N.Y. Code of Remedial
Justice ch. 1, tit. II, art. 2 § 66 (1876)); see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
§ 9.1.4, at 496 n.4 (1986) (noting statutes that declare that the measure of a lawyer's
compensation is to be fixed by the client-lawyer agreement). But cf. Lester Brickman &
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary,
Statutory and Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 170 (1988) [hereinafter Brickman &
Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers] (arguing that a strict interpretation of these statutes
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Similarly, the provisions of conflict of interest rules that require
lawyers to fully disclose and explain personal interests in represen-
tation99 and in business transactions with clients' ° suggest both
that clients are not always able to identify pertinent considerations
on their own and that lawyers have some fiduciary-type obligation
to help their clients understand the situation even when doing so is
against the lawyers' own interests. On the other hand, although
psychological factors affect potential clients equally, the conflict
rules are unclear about whether the obligation to advise arises at
the preemployment stage.101 Moreover, the conflict rules only specify
that lawyers must inform clients of the competing considerations;
they do not forbid lawyers to attempt to sway the client to waive the
conflict.102 One could, therefore, reasonably interpret the code
drafters' intent in competing ways. The codes may envision clients
as needing a lawyer's assistance in making decisions or they may
view clients as capable of exercising autonomy, provided that they
have adequate information.
The professional codes are equally equivocal with respect to the
way information must be transmitted. The codes require writings
about some specific aspects of retainer agreements,'0 ' which
suggests a need for formality that will impress the client with the
importance of the information and a need to establish evidentiary
support for a lawyer's after-the-fact assertion that the client was
fully informed. Yet the codes also seem to allow lawyers to bury the
necessary information in long retainer documents that unsophisti-
cated clients may not read or fully understand.104 Once again, these
is "inconsistent with judicial doctrine treating the attorney-client contract as an aspect of
fiduciary law").
99. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFV CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2006) (requiring lawyers to identify
personal conflicts and to obtain "informed consent" for a waiver).
100. See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(a) (requiring full disclosure).
101. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
102. See Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts, supra note 5, at 432 (discussing Model Rule 1.7 and
noting its failure to identify a duty of the lawyer to provide objective advice regarding conflict
waivers).
103. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2006) (requiring written
contingent fee contracts); id. R. 1.7 (requiring written conflict waivers).
104. Under a model that truly seeks to preserve client interests, a lawyer would be
required to highlight key information, explain it, ensure the client understands it, and ensure
the client is processing it in an intelligent fashion. This is the model adopted in Model Rule
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conflicting approaches send mixed signals regarding the extent of
clients' abilities to exercise autonomy in retainer-related decision
making and the extent of lawyers' obligations to assist them.
One final set of code provisions is pertinent in assessing the
drafters' intentions. In the basic lawyer competence rules, the codes
allow lawyers to accept cases and hold themselves out as competent
to represent clients with respect to any field in which the lawyers
can "make themselves" competent or can enlist the assistance of
specialists." 5 These rules cut against the notion that lawyers
ordinarily should refer clients to other lawyers who can provide
better representation-be they specialists or organizations that focus
on a particular type of client. The competence rules are an aspect of
a larger issue: to what extent does, or should, professional regula-
tion encourage or officially approve specialization that might lead
to better service in individual cases but also result in fewer lawyers
able to provide representation?
The codes address specialization directly only in the advertising
rules, which seek to prevent clients from being misled by specialty
designations made by lawyers who have no legitimate claim of
expertise.106 The codes' position on the converse question-whether
clients should be assisted in learning of true specialists and
encouraged to consult them as a routine-is unclear. The same
ambivalence is exhibited by bar referral services, which assist
clients in finding lawyers who practice in a particular field but
typically permit the participating lawyers to self-designate their
expertise.' 7 This tension between allowing lawyers to represent a
broad range of clients and enabling clients to find the right lawyer
for their particular cases is inherent in the issue of when and
1.8(a), which requires lawyers not only to identify the client's interests in a business
transaction with the lawyer, but also to explain the "desirability" of seeking independent
advice about the matter. Id. R. 1.8(a).
105. See, e.g., id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2.
106. See, e.g., id. R. 7.4(d) (forbidding a lawyer to claim a specialty unless certified by an
approved designated certifying agency).
107. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; cf. FTC Urges Texas Bar To Let Attorneys
Participate in Online Matching Services, 22 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 284
(June 14, 2006) [hereinafter FTC Urges] (discussing FTC decision to urge Texas State Bar to
reconsider Texas Ethics Op. 561, which forbids lawyer participation in online services that
attempt to match clients and lawyers on the basis that such services constitute a "prohibited
lawyer referral service rather than permissible advertising").
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whether lawyers must advise potential clients to seek representa-
tion elsewhere.
C. Person-specificity of Representation Under the Legal Ethics
Codes
One relevant consideration in assessing lawyers' duties to clients
at the retainer stage is whether, as a general matter, the legal
ethics codes expect lawyers to treat clients generically or as
individuals whose personal needs must be met. By definition, rules
make group distinctions. At some level, instructions in the legal
ethics codes must be addressed to lawyers and clients as a whole.
Nevertheless, to the extent the codes envision lawyers providing
information and advice based on individualized characteristics of
clients, one might expect the codes to anticipate individualized
retainer discussions as well.
On the surface, at least, the main provisions of the codes that
mandate the provision of information-such as Model Rules 1.4,108
1.5,109 1.7,110 and 1.8 111-do not distinguish among clients based on
their sophistication or individual needs. These rules merely require
all lawyers to provide information, in some instances specifying
items to be communicated that will help clients make particular
decisions"' or consider whether to waive particular rights.113 Under
this conception of lawyers as facilitators of client autonomy, lawyers'
obligations to advise clients at the retainer stage might reasonably
be limited to providing fee information and making sure the
prospective clients understand the obvious fact that other providers
(with potentially different competence and fee structures) exist.
In other respects, however, the legal ethics codes make finer
distinctions. The basic communication rules, such as Model Rule
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF L CoNDucT R. 1.4 (2006) (requiring communication with
clients).
109. Id. R. 1.5(b)-(c) (governing fees and contingency fee arrangements).
110. Id. R. 1.7(b)(4) (requiring informed consent to conflicted representation).
111. Id. R. 1.8(a)(1) (requiring disclosures prior to a business transaction with a client); id.
R. 1.8(f) (requiring informed consent to third-party fee payments); id. R. 1.8(h)(2) (requiring
written advice regarding settlement of a malpractice claim).
112. See, e.g., id. R. 1.4; id. R. 1.5(b)-(c).
113. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7.
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1.4, specify that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation."114 This suggests that the
information to be provided must take into account the client's
sophistication, likely knowledge, and state of mind, because those
characteristics are pertinent to whether the client can make
informed decisions. Bolstering this interpretation is the inclusion of
a definition of "informed consent" in new Model Rule 1.0(e) that
refers specifically to the "adequacy" of the advice.' 15
Similarly, conflict of interest waiver rules typically forbid lawyers
to accept client decisions allowing conflicted lawyers to represent
them unless the client gives "informed consent""' 6 and the lawyer
has explained "the implications" and "advantages and risks"
involved in the representation." 7 The codes also require lawyers to
protect the interests of a client who has "diminished capacity, is at
risk of substantial ... harm unless action is taken and cannot
adequately act in [her] own interest.""' The codes thus seem to
make distinctions among clients and different clients' abilities to
receive and act upon information. If lawyers have obligations to
provide information at the retainer stage that parallel their
obligations toward existing clients, the codes arguably envision that
lawyers will tailor their advice to the sophistication and needs of
each prospective client.
D. Common Law Regulation
The common law regulates lawyers' professional conduct in at
least three basic ways. Malpractice law defines duties to clients and
provides remedies for a lawyer's failure to satisfy the standard of
care. "'9 Common law defining fiduciary duties limits the ways in
which lawyers may pursue their own interests to the detriment of
114. Id. R. 1.4(b).
115. Id. R. 1.0(e). Rule 1.0(e) defines informed consent as agreement after the lawyer "has
communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and
reasonably available alternatives ...." Id. (emphasis added).
116. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7(b)(4).
117. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.7(b)(2) (1999).
118. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.14(b) (2006).
119. Depending on the jurisdiction, malpractice may be a tort or contract cause of action.
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clients. Fraud principles and other consumer remedies constrain
what lawyers may say and do in order to induce third parties to rely
upon them.
Arguably, each of these three branches of the common law might
impose obligations on lawyers in their pre-representation dealings
with potential clients. In individual cases, courts have sent signals
that the common law has a significant role to play in regulating the
retainer stage. At the same time, other aspects of the legal doctrines
cast doubt on the significance of the various causes of action in
providing protection to potential clients.
1. Malpractice
At one level, malpractice law is clear. In order to recover under a
malpractice theory, a litigant must have been either a client of the
lawyer or the intended beneficiary of services the lawyer contracted
to perform. 2 ° In theory, therefore, malpractice law does not impose
obligations that protect the prospective client.
In practice, however, courts have muddied malpractice doctrine
in two ways. In some cases, they have found prospective clients to
be clients for malpractice purposes even though they might not be
considered clients under the professional codes. For example, in
Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller, & Keefe, the court held that an
attorney had a duty to inform the potential client of the applicable
statute of limitations despite the fact that the lawyer ultimately
declined the representation. 2' Assuming the lawyer made his
declination of representation clear,'22 Mrs. Togstad could not have
120. See generally Symposium, The Lawyer's Duties and Liabilities to Third Parties, 37 S.
TEX. L. REv. 957 (1996) (addressing duties to non-clients); Fred C. Zacharias, Lawyer Duties
to Amorphous Non-Clients, PROF. LAW., Aug. 1997, at 1, 4 (discussing when non-clients may
sue an attorney for malpractice).
121. 291 N.W.2d 686, 694 (Minn. 1980); see also Miller v. Metzinger, 154 Cal. Rptr. 22, 29
(Ct. App. 1979) (holding a lawyer potentially liable for failure to advise client of impending
statute of limitations).
122. In Togstad, the facts were complicated by a dispute about how the attorney responded
to the client's initial inquiry. Togstad, 291 N.W.2d at 690-92. The court ultimately found that
the lawyer's actions at least arguably gave rise to a legitimate expectation by the client that
the lawyer was representing her in evaluating the merits of the case. Id. at 693. Accordingly,
the court upheld the jury's decision to treat the potential client as a full client for malpractice
purposes. See id.
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sued him for failing to investigate or prosecute the case, but she was
entitled to certain malpractice protections at the retainer stage.
123
Some courts have extended this rationale to a requirement that
lawyers advise rejected potential clients that their cause of action
may be valid and worth pursuing with a different attorney. 124
Similarly, the case law suggests that persons may be clients for
some purposes and not others. During initial meetings with a
prospective attorney, potential clients ordinarily must provide
confidential information to the attorney. Courts uniformly recognize
that this information is privileged and confidential even when the
person never becomes a full client. 25 Likewise, a lawyer has an
obligation to the potential client to avoid conflicts of interest, despite
the fact that this duty (like the duty of confidentiality) typically
runs only to clients.'26
2. Fiduciary Duties
Fiduciary law ordinarily requires a lawyer to place the interests
of his client above the attorney's own interests. The issue for the
prospective client is whether she qualifies as "a client" for purposes
of fiduciary law. On the one hand, recognizing a fiduciary obligation
at the retainer stage by definition is problematic because in
123. Id. at 693.
124. See, e.g., Meighan v. Shore, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 744, 745-46 (Ct. App. 1995) (upholding
malpractice cause of action for a lawyer's failure to advise a potential client that she might
have a valid cause of action).
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 15(1)(a) (2000)
(providing that a lawyer has a duty of confidentiality to prospective clients even when no
client-lawyer relationship results); 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE § 17.6 (2006) (stating that "[t]he policy underlying protection of confidential
disclosures justifies the application of those principles in prospective attorney-client
relationships"); cf. In re Dupont's Estate, 140 P.2d 866, 873 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943) (holding
that discussions with a prospective client were immune from discovery in a subsequent
lawsuit involving the prospective client's state of mind); Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. v. Van Straaten
Gallery, Inc., 727 N.E.2d 240, 243 (Ill. 2000) (holding that communications made for the
purpose of obtaining prospective legal advice are protected from disclosure).
126. See Hickle v. Malone, 675 N.E.2d 48, 50-51 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (finding malpractice
might have occurred at the time the prospective client's attorney agreed to represent a party
adverse to the prospective client without consent); cf. Ghidoni v. Stone Oak, Inc., 966 S.W.2d
573, 599 (Tex. App. 1998) (discussing disqualification of a potential client's attorney from
subsequent representation involving the potential client).
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negotiating a fee the prospective lawyer almost always will be
placing his own interests over those of the potential client.'27 On the
other hand, because fiduciary law is based on notions of trust and
loyalty, it is reasonable to assume that potential clients sometimes
should be able to rely on the prospective counsel to emphasize their
interests, especially with respect to secrets the potential client may
confide.'28
The cases reflect this ambivalence. Courts clearly recognize
fiduciary duties at the retainer stage, some of which overlap
malpractice duties to safeguard secrets and preserve the potential
clients' interests by enabling clients to satisfy statute of limitation
requirements.'29 A lawyer who agrees to represent a client on a
127. As a result, one noted professional responsibility scholar has suggested that fiduciary
duties only "arise after the formation of the attorney-client relationship." GILLERS, supra note
14, at 63. For this conclusion, however, Professor Gillers relies on language in In re Marriage
of Pagano, 607 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. 1992), which focused on whether a fiduciary relationship
existed after the formation of an attorney-client relationship.
128. In discussing contingency fee agreements in tort cases, two commentators have
observed:
Discussion has arisen about whether the fiduciary relationship between an
attorney and a potential client is formed at the beginning of the fee negotiation
or whether the attorney is free to negotiate for as much remuneration as
possible before formally entering into the relationship on the basis that the
fiduciary duty does not arise until after the retainer agreement is signed. Some
argue that where ethics are concerned, this is shaving the situation far too
thinly and that an attorney has a fiduciary duty to prospective clients as well as
actual clients. This is especially true where those prospective clients are
unsophisticated and lack appreciable bargaining power. After all, even though,
as frequently advertised, an attorney may agree not to charge for the initial
meeting with the prospective client, that meeting is nevertheless a
"consultation" with a professional, carrying with it the obligation to provide
sound advice as to how to proceed.
Stephen D. Annand & Roberta F. Green, Legislative and Judicial Controls of Contingency Fees
in Tort Cases, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 81, 89 (1996).
129. See, e.g., Miller v. Metzinger, 154 Cal. Rptr. 22, 29 (Ct. App. 1979) (finding a duty to
preserve the client's claim against expiration); see also Kearns v. Fred Lavery Porsche Audi
Co., 745 F.2d 600, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("Mhe fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer
and client extends to preliminary consultation by a prospective client with a view to retention
of the lawyer, although actual employment does not result." (quoting Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978))); Domen v. Sugarman, 54 Va.
Cir. 176, 178 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (noting the "ethical and moral duty" to a potential client to "take
immediate steps to protect the interest of [the] potential client, or at least advise the ...
potential client of what steps need to be taken to protect those interests"); 2 MALLEN & SMITH,
supra note 125, § 17.6 ("Some courts, however, have based their analysis upon implying an
attorney-client relationship. This approach is overly formulistic, because a prospective client
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limited basis may nonetheless owe a duty to advise the client
regarding other causes of action she might file or investigate (e.g.,
using a different lawyer).13 °
Yet the fiduciary duty owed to a potential client also seems to be
different, and less than the fiduciary duty owed a full client. In Flatt
v. Superior Court, for example, a prospective client consulted a
lawyer who determined that there was a conflict of interest with
another client, whom the potential client intended to sue.13' The
lawyer declined representation but did not advise the prospective
client about the statute of limitations because doing so would have
prejudiced the existing client.132 The court opined that the lawyer
was "absolved" from fulfilling her fiduciary duty to the prospective
client as a result of the superior fiduciary duty she owed the full
client.133
Similarly, although courts have recognized some obligations of
lawyers in negotiating fees with potential clients, those appear to be
lesser obligations than those that apply when lawyers renegotiate
fees with existing full clients.'34 The former situation is governed
primarily by principles of unconscionability-the lawyer may not
ask for more than a reasonable fee.' 35 The renegotiation situation,
can enter into a fiduciary relationship, without an attorney-client relationship." (footnote
omitted)).
130. See, e.g., Janik v. Rudy, Exelrod & Zieff, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 751, 758-59 (Ct. App. 2004)
(finding a duty of class action lawyers to inform the clients of possible claims other than those
the court has certified); Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 610 (Ct. App. 1993) ("[A]
lawyer who signs an application for adjudication of a workers' compensation claim and a
lawyer who accepts a referral to prosecute the claim owe the claimant a duty of care to advise
on available remedies, including third party actions."); Keef v. Widuch, 747 N.E.2d 992, 999
(Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (agreeing with Nichols that even when representing clients on a limited
basis, an attorney in a workers' compensation matter has a duty to inform a client of potential
claims of which he is unaware); see also Brickman, supra note 6, at 58 ("[F]iduciary
obligations can arise in the absence of a full representational relationship.").
131. 885 P.2d 950, 951 (Cal. 1994).
132. Id. at 952.
133. Id. at 953, 959.
134. See WOLFRAM, supra note 98, § 9.2.1, at 503 (noting courts' skepticism toward fee
agreements that change original agreements in the midst of representation); Brickman, supra
note 5, at 1183 (noting the existence of a fiduciary obligation in negotiating fees with potential
clients, but lax judicial enforcement of the duty).
135. See, e.g., Fourchon Docks, Inc. v. Milchem Inc., 849 F.2d 1561, 1568 (5th Cir. 1988)
(applying a reasonableness requirement of Model Rule 1.5); Allen v. United States, 606 F.2d
432, 435 (4th Cir. 1979) ("Associated with a court's power to allocate part of the recovery to
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however, commonly is viewed as a separate "business transaction"
with the client, which triggers a series of requirements of fairness
and care.136
3. Fraud and Other Consumer Remedies
Some courts have determined that fee agreements with prospec-
tive clients are arm's length in nature and so, absent fraud,
misrepresentation, or unconscionability, are enforceable." 7 Other
counsel is its obligation to limit the fee to a reasonable amount. A court abuses its discretion
if it allows a fee without carefully considering the factors relevant to fair compensation.");
Dunn v. H. K. Porter Co., Inc., 602 F.2d 1105, 1108 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that courts may
supervise the reasonableness of fee contracts); In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.
1975) (holding that a court has inherent power to examine the amount charged by an attorney
in order to protect client from excessive fees); see also Brickman, supra note 5, at 1196
('Under fiduciary principles, fee contracts between a lawyer and a client must be objectively
reasonable; unreasonable fees are unenforceable.").
136. See Mayhew v. Benninghoff, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 27,28 (Ct. App. 1997) ('There are higher
presumptions, designed to protect clients in their business dealings with their attorneys. The
onus is on the attorney to show no advantage was taken and that the client was given full and
frank disclosure."); Baron v. Mare, 120 Cal. Rptr. 675, 679-80 (Ct. App. 1975) (holding that
after a fee agreement is signed, a fiduciary relationship is established and a presumption of
insufficient consideration and undue influence in a fee renegotiation takes effect); see also
Anderson v. Sconza, 534 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) ('The presumption of undue
influence where an attorney fee contract is entered into after the establishment of the
attorney-client relationship ... is a strong presumption."); Alexander v. Inman, 903 S.W.2d
686, 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) ('The amount of good faith which an attorney must exercise
in transactions with a client is, therefore, much higher than that required in other business
transactions where the parties are dealing at arm's length."); cf. Douglas R. Richmond,
Changing Fee Agreements During Representations: What Are the Rules?, 15 PROF. LAW. 2
(2004) (discussing renegotiation of fees).
137. See, e.g., Griffin v. Birch Brook Agency, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 142, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(rejecting a request for additional attorneys' fees on the basis that the original payment of fees
reflected an arm's-length agreement); Potter v. Daily, 40 N.E.2d 339, 344 (Ind. 1942)
(upholding a fee agreement, including subsequent modification); Edler v. Frazier, 156 N.W.
182, 185 (Iowa 1916) (explaining that if a client accepts the terms of the retainer agreement,
the client "is bound by every principle of law and good morals to make payment accordingly");
Holt v. Swenson, 90 N.W.2d 724, 727-28 (Minn. 1958) (holding that the contingent fee contract
is valid unless the attorney took advantage of a client's circumstances to extract an
unreasonable or unconscionable fee); Dockery v. McLellan, 67 N.W. 733, 735 (Wis. 1896) ('The
parties stood to each other at arm's end, and, there being neither fraud nor undue influence,
it was competent for the plaintiff to make the contract; and the transaction having succeeded
... we do not see upon what ground he can resist the plaintiff's claim for the stipulated one-
third of his share of the profits."); cf. C.W. Higgins v. Beaty, 88 S.E.2d 80, 83 (N.C. 1955)
(stating that a contract made at arm's length "is as valid and unobjectionable as if made
between other persons not occupying fiduciary relations").
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courts, however, have refused to enforce a retainer agreement "in
the absence of proof that it was fully comprehended by the client."13
These courts seem to be enhancing ordinary fraud remedies for
prospective clients, imposing an affirmative duty of explanation to
ensure the prospective client is not confused, above and beyond the
duty not to misrepresent.
139
E. Conclusions About the Current Regulatory Regime
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the current regulatory
regime is ambiguous about lawyers' obligations to potential clients
at the retainer stage of representation. Legal ethics codes are
limited in their explicit mandates and some cases suggest that
retainer discussions should be conceptualized as arm's-length
negotiations. On the other hand, both the codes and the common
law contain suggestions that private individuals are entitled to
depend on lawyers to advise them fully and that lawyers should
tailor advice to each individual's need for information and guidance
before the individuals make decisions or assign their rights.
Many prospective clients can obtain the information necessary for
making informed retainer-related decisions only from the lawyers
they consult. 4° Moreover, as an empirical matter, prospective
clients are not always capable of soliciting that information without
prompting from the attorney. There is ample room for interpreta-
tions of both the legal ethics codes and the common law that would
138. Larrison v. Scarola Reavis & Parent LLP, 812 N.Y.S.2d 243, 248 (Sup. Ct. 2005)
(citing Ransom v. Cutting, 98 N.Y.S. 282 (App. Div. 1906), and Cohen v. Ryan, 311 N.Y.S.2d
644 (App. Div. 1970)). Lawyers also have been found liable for violations of ordinary consumer
protection statutes that regulate deceptive practices. See, e.g., Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196,
200 (Colo. 2006) (finding lawyers potentially liable for deceptive advertising under Colorado
law).
139. See, e.g., Winburn, Lewis & Barrow, P.C. v. Richardson, 504 S.E.2d 480, 481-82 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1998) (upholding a verdict based on a lawyer's failure to explain the fee agreement);
cf. Ramirez v. Sturdevant, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 561 (Ct. App. 1994) (upholding insertion of
provision into retainer agreement that client did not understand on the basis that it was
"fair").
140. Cf. Brickman& Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers, supra note 98, at 154 (arguing
that the "better view" is that lawyers are fiduciaries at the retainer stage because "the client's
retention of an attorney to exercise 'professional judgment' on his behalf necessarily requires
the client to repose trust and confidence in the attorney" (footnote omitted)).
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require attorneys to protect prospective clients' interests by con-
ducting retainer discussions tailored to the clients' needs.
III. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE ETHICAL POSTURE FOR LAWYERS AT
THE PREEMPLOYMENT STAGE?
The analysis above suggests that one could-and that regulators
might-interpret existing law as imposing preemployment obliga-
tions on lawyers. The current ambiguity in the law also suggests
that regulators would do well to clarify the role of lawyers at the
retainer stage. It therefore becomes important, both for lawyers
seeking to do the right thing and for regulators defining lawyers'
duties, to identify the appropriate contours of lawyers' preem-
ployment roles.
Legal ethics standards typically are premised on the assumption
that lawyers should not, and should not be allowed to, take advan-
tage of client weaknesses.14' Lawyers are held to a high standard of
conduct that encompasses dealing fairly with clients' and unrepre-
sented third parties.'43 Overall, the professional codes are firm in
subordinating lawyers' personal interests in obtaining business to
prospective clients' interests in making calm and informed decisions
about representation.'
What about countervailing values? Although we have seen that
the professional codes and common law regulatory scheme send
mixed signals about the extent of lawyers' preemployment obliga-
tions (fiduciary or otherwise), the ambiguity is not based on a
calculus that independent societal or third party interests justify
limiting prospective clients' rights. In some areas of professional
regulation, the codes seem to implement independent substantive
141. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFtL CONDUcT R. 1.8(a) (2006) (strictly regulating
lawyers' business transactions with clients).
142. See, e.g., id. R. 1.4 (requiring communication with clients); id. R. 1.7 cmt. (emphasizing
loyalty to clients).
143. See, e.g., id. R. 4.3, 4.4 (defining lawyer obligations to third parties).
144. That is the premise underlying the various code rules against soliciting clients in
circumstances in which the client might feel pressured or might make an overly emotional
decision. E.g., id. R. 7.3; see also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995)
(upholding the constitutionality of a restriction on targeted mail solicitations of accident
victims within thirty days of an accident).
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values such as lawyer autonomy'45 and lawyers' freedom to compete
for business,14 but never at a cost to loyalty to clients. Indeed, the
conflict of interest rules make clear that lawyers' personal interests
must always be subordinated to clients' or prospective clients'
interests, absent informed consent to the contrary. 4  The code
drafters' failure to emphasize preemployment obligations through
specific rules seems to be attributable either to oversight or to a sub
rosa practical decision that particular rules would not be worth the
costs (e.g., in enforcing regulation).48
Because the substantive values emphasized by the codes are
consistent with the finding of preemployment duties, it is fair to
consider those values in formulating the contours of possible
preemployment obligations. The codes' general orientation towards
the interaction between laypersons and lawyers provides guidance.
The codes rely on the principle that lawyers should not take advan-
tage of clients' and unrepresented third parties' weaknesses.1
41
Given the range of potential clients' sophistication and expectations
of the bar, that principle suggests that lawyers' responsibilities to
prospective clients would need to include at least the following:
lawyers should make sure that potential clients are in a position to
make reasonable decisions regarding the representation agree-
ment. 0 A lawyer who is not willing to do so at a minimum should
warn the potential client that he is dealing with the client at arm's
length, that the lawyer's and potential client's interests in reaching
a retainer agreement diverge, and that it may be wise for the
potential client to comparison shop and (depending on the client)
145. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct,
91 MINN. L. REv. 265, 280 (2006) (discussing rules arguably emphasizing lawyer autonomy).
146. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1, 7.2 (2006) (permitting lawyer
advertising).
147. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2) (forbidding a lawyer to represent a client when the representation
would be affected by the lawyer's own interests).
148. Regulators certainly can reasonably reach such practical judgments once particular
rules are proposed. But it is important to note that those judgments are different in nature
than a decision based on normative principles militating against the creation of
preemployment obligations.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
150. Cf. Brickman, supra note 6, at 53 (arguing that a lawyer proposing a contingency fee
arrangement owes a duty to "provid[e] the means for the client to assess what fee structure
is in his best interests").
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seek independent advice regarding the wisdom of the representa-
tion."'
The practical ramification of finding that the lawyer's role
encompasses these client-protective attributes is that each lawyer,
before signing a retainer agreement, would be expected to ascertain
that the client has a requisite level of information and is in a
position to act upon it. A lawyer must be confident that the potential
client has been educated regarding three important factors. First,
the client should know before proceeding that it is wise to engage
representation of the type the lawyer proposes to provide. Second,
the client should have the information necessary to determine that
this lawyer is a reasonable choice of counsel, which includes having
a sense of the available alternatives and the level of this lawyer's
qualifications and expertise. Third, the client should be sufficiently
informed to reach a decision that the fees the lawyer proposes to
charge are reasonable; she must know what alternative fee arrange-
ments are possible and the extent to which cheaper representation
is likely to be available.
In some cases, particularly those involving unsophisticated
clients, merely providing information may not be enough. Informa-
tion is meaningless unless the lawyer assures himself that the client
is in a position to act upon the information she has received. The
provision of information therefore must be sufficient to counteract
the client's dependence on counsel and enable the client to assess
the need for this type of representation and the lawyer's abilities. In
other words, the client must have both the tools and the capacity to
investigate alternatives.
If this is an accurate assessment of clients' needs and the
corresponding responsibilities of lawyers at the preemployment
stage, it seems clear that the degree of assistance lawyers must
provide prospective clients ultimately will depend on each client's
sophistication and experience. Highly sophisticated clients will
know much of the necessary information before even consulting the
lawyer, including the need for particular representation and the
151. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Images of Lawyers, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 73, 95 (2007)
[hereinafter Zacharias, Images of Lawyers] (arguing that the professional codes should require
lawyers to identify the existence of lawyer self-interest at the beginning of the
representation).
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range of likely fees. On the other hand, clients who do not have the
wherewithal to understand or investigate alternatives may be
entitled either to affirmative efforts by the lawyer to help them
determine the choices or to an explicit disclaimer informing the
clients that they should seek external assistance in making the
hiring decision.
15 2
This leads to the devil that lies in the details of the lawyer's
preemployment ethical role. First, what precisely must lawyers do
at the retainer stage? Second, what do they not need to do; in other
words, what is simply expecting too much of the bar? And third, can
professional rules or common law regulation effectively encourage
lawyers to fulfill their obligations at a reasonable cost?'53
The first issue has been partly answered. At a minimum, the
lawyer ought to make sure the prospective client has focused on the
three core questions: Is the proposed type of representation
appropriate? Is this lawyer a reasonable choice for the client? Is the
fee arrangement fair and appropriate given the available alterna-
tives? The lawyer must also provide the information that the client
needs to resolve these questions, or educate the client on why she
should obtain the information independently. Finally, the lawyer
should be confident that the client can obtain and understand the
information in a way that will enable her to make an informed
choice of counsel.
What are the lawyer's obligations, however, when he does not
have the information at hand? For example, suppose the lawyer
does not know precisely who has special qualifications to practice in
the area in question or what fees other lawyers would charge. Must
the lawyer himself conduct an investigation of the alternatives?'
At one extreme, the professional rules already make clear that
the lawyer may not misstate the facts.'55 He may not misrepresent,
152. See authorities cited supra note 14.
153. The third issue will be addressed partly in this section, which considers the negative
effects particular requirements might have. Other aspects of the question-particularly
enforcement of existing and any new rules-are addressed in Part IV.
154. Presumably, the lawyer could not charge the potential client a fee for this
investigation without the client's consent.
155. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2006) ("It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.").
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or convey to the potential client, that his expertise and charges are
in the mainstream. Lawyers have obligations to third parties,
including potential clients, not to mislead.
156
The ethical role described above suggests that lawyers also have
an affirmative duty of disclosure. To the extent they do not know
important information, they need to advise the potential client that
they do not know, make clear that the information is important, and
suggest ways in which the client might go about informing herself.
This obligation is consistent with the requirements, identified in
judicial decisions, that lawyers who reject potential clients' cases
must advise the clients of the statute of limitations and must avoid
expressing inaccurate opinions regarding the merits. 157 Lawyers'
obligations to prospective clients may be limited, but they encom-
pass some duty to help prospective clients preserve their rights.
Remaining is the issue of whether a lawyer has any duty to
investigate the competition, so as to put himself in a position to
provide the information he does not know.' Certainly, lawyers
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Miller v. Metzinger, 154 Cal. Rptr. 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding that an
attorney who investigated a prospective client's case had a duty to inform client of statute of
limitations); Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980)
(finding negligence by an attorney who declined representation but gave the prospective client
erroneous advice and failed to inform her of the statute of limitations); Procanik v. Cillo, 543
A.2d 985, 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (holding that an attorney who states the law
to a prospective client is responsible for giving accurate advice).
158. This issue has arisen in a few isolated cases in which clients, or potential clients, have
sued referring attorneys for "negligence" in the referral. See generally Emily S. Lassiter,
Comment, Liability for Referral of Attorneys, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 465, 465 & n. 1 (2000) (stating
that the number of jurisdictions recognizing the cause of action "is growing rapidly," but citing
only three cases); Andrew J. Martin, Jr., Comment, Legal Malpractice: Negligent Referral as
a Cause of Action, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 679, 690 (1999) (analyzing cases in which courts have
recognized a cause of action). For the most part, such causes of action have been recognized
only where the referring lawyer has a full attorney-client relationship with the person being
referred or has accepted a fee for making the referral. See, e.g., Tormo v. Yormark, 398 F.
Supp. 1159, 1171 (D.N.J. 1975) (holding referring lawyer negligent for failing to learn that out
of state counsel had been indicted for fraud); Noris v. Silver, 701 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a referring lawyer who accepts a fee may be liable for supervising
the other attorney); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 85-1514,
at 559 (1985) (equating acceptance of a referral fee to acceptance of joint responsibility for the
management of the case). To impose liability on a lawyer who merely suggests other lawyers
in a case in which he may not be qualified would provide significant disincentives for lawyers
to make referrals and perverse incentives for clients to request referrals in the hope of being
able to sue the referring lawyer if the case ultimately goes awry.
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should not have such a duty across the board. When a client is
sufficiently sophisticated to investigate on her own and knows she
should do so, there simply is no reason to transfer the cost and
responsibility for conducting the investigation to the lawyer. A
contrary rule would create disincentives for clients to make rea-
sonable choices; it would encourage prospective clients to rely on
counsel and file suit against the lawyer at a later time if the reliance
proves misplaced. A better argument exists that lawyers should
bear the responsibility to investigate when it is clear that the client
is unable to do so on her own. Even in those situations, however,
imposing this duty would be inefficient (e.g., in its deterrent effects),
a factor that regulators would have to take into account in determin-
ing whether to impose responsibility.
A different conclusion seems warranted on the question of
whether lawyers should be required to research the appropriateness
of alternative approaches to the matter, such as mediation, if the
lawyer has no personal experience in that field. In agreeing to
represent the client, the lawyer holds himself out as sufficiently
knowledgeable to decide how to proceed. By definition, whether
alternative approaches make better sense is part of the advice the
lawyer will need to provide, even if the lawyer himself would not
handle the alternative representation."' A priori, the lawyer should
not be able to use personal ignorance of the alternative field as a
justification for failing to provide potential clients with information
about the possible alternatives before the client invests in the case.
An uninformed lawyer has a duty to inform himself, at least to the
extent necessary to help the client decide whether representation by
the lawyer is the best choice.
When, if ever, should a lawyer be obliged to refer potential clients
to other providers who might charge less for the same services?
After all, law is a business. 60 Even unsophisticated clients are likely
159. The recent revisions to the Model Rules include a suggestion to this effect,
incorporated after the ABA rejected a proposal to mandate advice regarding alternative
dispute resolution possibilities. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 5 (2006)
("[W]hen a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform
the client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to
litigation."). For a discussion of the proposed rule, see Gerald F. Phillips, The Obligation of
Attorneys To Inform Clients About ADR, 31 W. ST. U. L. REv. 239 (2004).
160. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
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to understand that some variation exists in what lawyers charge.
Clients know they have an option to comparison shop, although for
psychological reasons some will hesitate to do so.'61 The mere fact
that prospective clients might want help in identifying alternative
counsel at the retainer stage does not itself justify overemphasizing
the potential lawyer's obligations.
Because malpractice law tends to hold lawyers accountable for the
unintended consequences of actions they take with respect to
potential clients,'62 it seems particularly unfair to impose on lawyers
a general obligation to suggest other possible representatives. Doing
so might also create perverse incentives within the bar---causing an
increase in advertising specifically designed to promote referrals 6 '
and tacit agreements among groups of lawyers to cross-refer.'64
Moreover, because referrals to all cheaper alternatives ordinarily
will not be possible, lawyers who still have a hope of getting the
business would have an incentive to refer potential clients to
alternative lawyers who will make the worst impression.
One exception to the conclusion that lawyers should not be
required to make specific referrals seems appropriate, however.
When governmental or subsidized public interest organizations
exist that specialize in the work a potential client requires and
might provide free or low-cost service, the lawyer arguably should
be obliged to discuss that alternative with the client. Unsophisti-
cated clients commonly carry the inaccurate perception that such
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1229, 1233 (1995) (arguing for professional regulation based on a "Business Paradigm" that
would "promote respect for the legal system by removing the taint of duplicity resulting from
the Professionalism Paradigm's assertions of lawyer altruism to a disbelieving public");
Zacharias, Images of Lawyers, supra note 151, at 84-85 (discussing aspects of the professional
codes that recognize lawyers as businesspersons).
161. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller, & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980)
(finding that a lawyer unintentionally created a lawyer-client relationship through his
conversations with the client and therefore would be liable for failure to investigate and
prosecute the client's claims before the expiration of the statute of limitations).
163. In other words, if referring is mandated, particular lawyers might be able to force
referrals to them by increasing their name recognition through advertising.
164. Cross-referral arrangements already exist among groups of lawyers. The difference
in the scenarios discussed above is that a referring lawyer may still have a realistic hope of
obtaining the client's business when making the referral, which gives him an incentive not
to send the client to the best options available.
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organizations do not exist or, by definition, provide sub-standard
representation.'65 Although comparing ordinary competitors may
be difficult or impossible for a lawyer (e.g., because the assessment
of relative quality-for-the-price may be subjective), a lawyer who is
aware that the client is eligible for subsidized representation by a
reputable organization should know that the client has a clear
choice to make. Even recognition of a rudimentary fiduciary obli-
gation on the lawyer's part would require the lawyer in this context
to avoid placing his own interests ahead of the client's.
Finally, there is the question of lawyers' obligations, if any, with
respect to alternative fee arrangements that the client may prefer.
For example, must a lawyer who wishes to charge a reasonable fixed
fee also offer a contingency arrangement or refer the client to
lawyers who might represent them on a contingency basis?
In a peculiar ethics opinion, the ABA has interpreted the ethics
rule requiring fees to be reasonable as also requiring lawyers in
most circumstances to offer clients alternative fee arrangements. 166
On the surface, the opinion seems an unwarranted intrusion into
lawyers' freedom to conduct their business and to reject cases when
the terms of representation are unsatisfactory to them.'67 There are
two possible explanations for the ABA decision. It may stem from a
sense that lawyers have a separate obligation to make legal services
available'68 and that offering alternative fee possibilities helps fulfill
that obligation. More likely, however, the decision reflects the ABA's
desire to limit the ability of lawyers to induce clients to engage fee-
for-service representation that they cannot afford when contingency,
or alternative, arrangements might be available.'69
165. See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts et al., Public Defender's Conundrum: Signaling
Professionalism and Quality in the Absence of Price, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 525, 527-28 & n.4
(2000) (presenting "research which indicates that public defenders are likely to be perceived
unfairly and inaccurately by criminal defendants" and cataloging previous empirical studies
to the same effect).
166. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1521 (1986). The
ABA opinion is analyzed in Green & Zacharias, supra note 145, at 292.
167. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 145, at 292-94.
168. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2006) ("[E]very lawyer has a professional
responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay.").
169. Alternatively, the ABA may have been concerned with lawyers presented with easily
winnable cases turning those cases into contingency representation against the clients'
interests.
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If the latter explanation justifies the opinion, however, the
response of the ABA should have been an informational require-
ment, not a requirement that lawyers personally offer alternative
fee arrangements. It is inaccurate to say that an hourly fee arrange-
ment is "unreasonable," irrespective of the size of the fee, if no
contingency arrangement is offered. As a practical matter, lawyers
can circumvent the ABA's requirement simply by sizing up their
clients before making any offer of representation and, when they do
offer alternative (e.g., contingency) arrangements that are unpalat-
able to them, to make them unpalatable to the potential clients as
well.
In contrast, it would make perfect sense for regulators to expect
lawyers to advise potential clients that some lawyers might be
willing to provide similar representation on an alternate basis.
Clients may be unaware of this information and, in the absence of
such advice, may assume they have no choices. To the extent a
lawyer has an obligation to assist the client in making informed
decisions at the retainer stage, such information would appear to be
a key, and fair, component.
IV. CURRENT REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE PREEMPLOYMENT
ETHICAL DUTY AND ALTERNATIVES FOR PROTECTING PROSPECTIVE
CLIENTS' INTERESTS
For purposes of argument, suppose that regulators-including
code drafters, disciplinary agencies, and courts--come to the
conclusion that the lawyer's ethical role, as defined in the codes and
common law, already encompasses a duty of fair dealing with
prospective clients, as outlined above. Suppose further that a lawyer
violates that duty, either by taking a case he should not or by failing
to offer the potential client information about the alternatives. The
lawyer, however, ultimately provides legally competent representa-
tion in the matter. What are, or what should be, the client's
remedies for the lawyer's misconduct?
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A. Remedies Under the Current Regime
Under the prevailing professional rules, it is hard to imagine that
regulators could establish a successful case for discipline. Arguably,
the hypothetical lawyer violated conflict of interest rules requiring
him to alert the client to "a significant risk" that the representation
would be "materially limited by ... a personal interest of the
lawyer."'7 ° Yet the fact that better alternative representation might
have been available does not establish a significant risk of "limited
representation," particularly in a case in which the lawyer can prove
that the ultimate representation was competent. The regulators also
might claim that the lawyer ran afoul of the rule governing
communications with clients.71 ' However, the reasonableness
standards in the communication rule, combined with the necessity
of establishing that potential clients are covered, make the rule a
weak tool for discipline. At a minimum, the first violators targeted
for discipline under the rule would have a solid claim that prosecu-
tion violates due process,'72 based on the inadequacy of notice the
rule provides.173
170. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2006).
171. Id. R. 1.4.
172. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 552 (1968) (reversing disbarment on grounds that
the disbarred attorney received insufficient notice that his conduct was subject to discipline);
Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102-05 (1963) (noting that due process
requirements apply to hearings regarding lawyer fitness to practice). Typically, however,
courts have implemented due process requirements loosely in lawyer disciplinary cases. See,
e.g., Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 229 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Although both the Supreme Court
and this court have often relied on this 'quasi-criminal' characterization to hold that 'an
attorney is entitled to procedural due process which includes notice and an opportunity to be
heard in disbarment proceedings,' we have only rarely gone farther." (internal citations
omitted)); In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) ("'All that is requisite ... is that ...
notice should be given to the attorney of the charges made and opportunity afforded him for
explanation and defence."' (quoting Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 540 (1868))
(emphasis omitted)). See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing
Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 39 n.231 (2005) (discussing due process
requirements in the context of attorney discipline).
173. The argument that the rules initially provide insufficient notice would be
strengthened by the reality that judicial decisions treating retainer agreements as arm's-
length transactions seem to instruct lawyers that they have no obligations to potential clients.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Would aggrieved prospective-turned-actual clients be able to sue
for breach of fiduciary duty? This Article's analysis suggests that
courts have recognized at least some fiduciary duty of lawyers at the
retainer stage. 74 The damage calculus, however, is complicated in
breach of fiduciary cases. 7 5 Fiduciary law forbids the fiduciary to
benefit himself at the client's expense and requires the violator to
disgorge his profits. 76 Assuming that the client can establish that
she would not have hired the lawyer had he not committed a breach
of his duty, the client must quantify the lawyer's benefit. Because
the lawyer in our hypothetical has provided competent representa-
tion-and expended his time-it would be difficult to argue that all
of the lawyer's fees are subject to forfeiture.'77 Even if the fees are
174. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
175. See, e.g., Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 241, 244 (Tex. 1999) (noting that "the
gravity and timing of the violation, its wilfulness, its effect on the value of the lawyer's work
for the client, any other threatened or actual harm to the client, and the adequacy of other
remedies" plus "the public interest in maintaining the integrity of attorney-client
relationships" must be taken into consideration when determining whether fee forfeiture is
appropriate); Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and
Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. Rev. 235, 255-56 (1994)
("[When] an attorney ... profits through a breach of his fiduciary obligation .... [e]xtraordinary
equitable remedies such as constructive trust, equitable lien, and rules of tracing are
available to the client to disgorge the profit from the hands of the attorney."); Meredith J.
Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Does
Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1160-61 (1999) (noting that clients
sometimes may "disgorge part or all of any fees earned by the attorney, even where the client
has suffered no actual harm ... [and] where the attorney's performance resulted in a favorable
result").
176. See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910) ("If [a fiduciary] takes any gift,
gratuity, or benefit in violation of his duty, or acquires any interest adverse to his principal,
without a full disclosure, it is a betrayal of his trust and a breach of confidence, and he must
account to his principal for all he has received."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt.
b (2003) ("[T]he fiduciary is under a duty not to profit at the expense of the other and not to
enter into competition with the other without the latter's consent."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 13 (1958) (discussing fiduciary duty of agents); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 190 cmt. a (1937) ("A person in a fiduciary relation to another is under a duty to act for the
benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relation."); RADFORD ET AL., supra
note 60, §§ 2, 541, 543 (discussing fiduciary duty between trustee and beneficiary).
177. In a few egregious cases, however, courts have determined that a total forfeiture of
fees is appropriate. See, e.g., Jackson v. Griffith, 421 So. 2d 677, 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(noting that an attorney who coerced a client into signing a fee agreement "[displayed] conduct
sufficient to void an agreement in law [and] should not be allowed to profit from his blatantly
unprofessional conduct in equity"); In re Estate of McCool, 553 A.2d 761, 769 (N.H. 1988)
("[Aln attorney who violates our rules of professional conduct by engaging in clear conflicts
of interest, of whose existence he either knew or should have known, may receive neither
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forfeit, absent an egregious violation, the lawyer probably is entitled
to quantum meruit for his services. 171 Consequently, the client's
potential recovery would be limited.
Because the lawyer performed competently, the client also would
have difficulty recovering damages under a malpractice, fraud, or
misrepresentation cause of action. 179 At best, the client may be able
to prove that she would have received cheaper or better representa-
tion elsewhere, or that she would have pursued a different course
altogether. Except in an extreme case, however, the client would be
unable to prove a legal injury because she did receive adequate
representation at a "reasonable fee." 8 '
A similar analysis negates any claim based on the lawyer's
misleading advertising. The lawyer's preemployment assertions
may have improperly induced the potential client to enter the
lawyer's office and engage the representation. But once engaged, the
hypothetical lawyer performed in a legally acceptable manner.
Proving the speculation that a different lawyer would have per-
formed better and produced a superior result for the client would be
an extraordinarily difficult task.
The inadequacy of the legal remedies for the ethical violations
might not be disturbing if one could be satisfied that market factors,
executor's nor legal fees for services he renders an estate."); Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329,
331 (N.Y. 1965) (holding that an attorney not licensed to practice law in the state is not
entitled to compensation for his services in a divorce proceeding); Pessoni v. Rabkin, 633
N.Y.S.2d 338, 338 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that an attorney representing multiple parties
was not entitled to compensation).
178. See Somuah v. Flachs, 721 A.2d 680, 691 (Md. 1998) (holding that where an attorney
is discharged because the client has a good faith basis to no longer wish to be represented by
the attorney and where the attorney has not engaged in serious misconduct, the attorney may
recover compensation from the client for the reasonable value of the services rendered by the
attorney prior to his discharge); Int'l Materials Corp. v. Sun Corp., Inc., 824 S.W.2d 890, 895
(Mo. 1992) ("Complete forfeiture, however, is warranted only when a lawyer's clear and
serious violation of a duty to a client is found to have destroyed the client-lawyer relationship
and thereby the justification for the lawyer's claim to compensation."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 cmt. d (2000) ("A lawyer's violation of duty to a client
warrants fee forfeiture only if the lawyer's violation was clear.... To warrant fee forfeiture a
lawyer's violation must also be serious.").
179. See supra Part II.D.
180. In those cases in which the lawyer charged an outlandish fee relative to his
competition, a court or disciplinary agency might find the fee arrangement to have been
unconscionable or to have violated rules against unreasonable fees. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2006).
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including the operation of reputation and competition, will suffi-
ciently encourage lawyers to fulfill their preemployment responsibil-
ity to refer clients elsewhere when appropriate. As noted, however,
failing to discuss and explain alternatives with clients is unlikely to
undermine a lawyer's reputation in the circles in which the
reputation for preemployment fairness matters.'' In other words,
the clients most likely to delve into lawyers' reputations are the
sophisticated clients who already have considered, or plan to
consider, alternatives on their own. Moreover, clients who rely on
lawyers' reputations typically are most likely to be interested in a
reputation for aggressiveness. Only a limited group of potential
clients will be attracted to a lawyer because of his reputation for
helping the clients identify the "right" representative. A lawyer
considering developing this sort of reputation is likely to balance its
benefits in attracting clients against the loss of business it might
entail when the lawyer sends clients away.
B. How Might Legal Standards Be Changed To Support Lawyers'
Preemployment Duties?
This Article has already noted that the legal ethics codes send
mixed signals about the role of lawyers.'82 One aspect of the Article's
concerns would be ameliorated were the drafters to introduce the
professional codes with a clear statement of the potentially conflict-
ing paradigms regarding lawyers upon which the codes rely.'83 Were
clients alerted up front to the reality that lawyers have their own
financial interests in some transactions with clients, including
retainer agreements, clients would at least be forewarned to protect
themselves and to take a lawyer's assertions with a grain of salt.
This Article's analysis suggests that it would also make sense for
the code drafters to add specific provisions governing the retainer
stage that list lawyers' specific obligations to potential clients. These
obligations might include:
181. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
182. See supra Parts II.B-C; see also Zacharias, Images of Lawyers, supra note 151, at 75-85
(discussing eight different paradigms of lawyers employed in the professional codes).
183. Zacharias, Images of Lawyers, supra note 151, at 94 (arguing that "the drafters have
failed in not directly addressing the issue of multiple roles, or images, of the bar").
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1. Advising potential clients objectively regarding the wisdom
of pursuing the type of representation being discussed;
2. Describing accurately the lawyer's (relative) expertise in
the type of representation being discussed;
3. Advising potential clients regarding the likely availability
of free or low-cost representation and the availability of
specialists in the field; and
4. Discussing the range of fees and alternative fee arrange-
ments that other qualified lawyers are likely to offer.
Whether such rules are added or not, however, the codes should
at a minimum clarify the meaning of providing advice that leads to
informed consent. The rules governing conflict of interest waivers,
limitations on the scope of representation, and transactions with
clients all currently require lawyers to tell clients about advantages
and risks of their decisions. 1 4 Yet these rules do not explicitly
require lawyers to advise clients-when appropriate-not to make
decisions that would benefit the lawyer."8 5 Accordingly, prospective
lawyers in whom clients repose trust at the retainer stage may feel
justified (or legally immunized) when they lead or induce clients to
decide in their favor after providing the requisite information.
Lawyers ought to be expected to support clients' interests more
directly.
One should not overstate the likely effects of these proposed
changes. As a practical matter, existing rules and law prohibiting
unreasonable fees and misrepresentation by lawyers already signal
to lawyers that they have some obligations at the retainer stage.' 6
Were an attorney to accept a case and then charge fees far in excess
184. See supra notes 73-74, 83-86 and accompanying text.
185. See Fred C. Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements: Should Clients Get What
They Pay For?, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 915, 946 (1998) (suggesting a "proactive approach
... requir[ing] lawyers to assess limited performance contracts ... from the clients'
perspectives" and arguing that "[t]he codes can protect prospective clients by requiring
lawyers to determine that the client be better off for agreeing to limited representation, as
compared to forgoing the opportunity to make the retainer agreement"); Zacharias, Waiving
Conflicts, supra note 5, at 426-29 (discussing the failure of the conflict rules to require lawyers
to act in the clients' best interests). But cf. Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 607-08 (Ct.
App. 1993) (suggesting possible malpractice liability for a lawyer who fails to advise a client
that additional representation is necessary).
186. See supra notes 83-86, 91 and accompanying text.
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of what other lawyers would charge or overstate his qualifications
compared to those of other attorneys, the courts probably would side
with the client in litigation against the attorney. The fee and
misrepresentation standards, however, are rarely enforced in these
contexts,1 87 so it is unclear whether lawyers think about them more
expansively than as a limited prohibition against egregious fees or
direct fraud. Moreover, lawyers correctly anticipate that the only
remedy for charging unconscionable fees is likely to be a reduction
in the amount collectable. Clarifying lawyers' obligations to give
suitable, objective advice in a broader range of situations therefore
would serve a useful purpose.
Suppose that the drafters make these changes to the codes. Would
identifying preemployment duties actually bring about significant
protection for prospective clients? The amendments would provide
guidance to well-meaning lawyers. They would eliminate doubt
about the existence and nature of lawyers' fiduciary obligations at
the retainer stage. Alone, however, they would do little to counteract
lawyers' self-interest in procuring engagements and fixing terms
most favorable to themselves. It may be especially unrealistic to
expect lawyers to give advice about competitors in a way that might
encourage clients to go elsewhere for representation, particularly in
circumstances in which the advising lawyer can find some justifica-
tion to withhold the advice.
On the other hand, the proposed rules might have several positive
enforcement effects. Because obligations at the retainer stage would
become clearer, discipline for failure to provide the required advice
becomes possible. To the extent a professional rule requires that
preemployment information and advice be provided in writing, the
possibility of disciplinary enforcement would also be enhanced. 8
Unlike most of the common law remedies, professional discipline
would not require a showing of harm to the client, but merely a
failure to inform.'8 9
187. See supra Part II.B.
188. See Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism, supra note 24, at 1367 (discussing the
relationship between written advice and disciplinary enforcement).
189. Of course, because the imposition of discipline will not bring a direct benefit to the
aggrieved potential client, she is unlikely to initiate and fund proceedings against the lawyer.
The enforcement benefits of a clear rule, therefore, would likely be evident only in disciplinary
proceedings initiated by the board when it learns of the lawyer's improprieties independently.
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Presumably, the identification of the lawyer's obligations also
would facilitate a client's civil claim for a breach of fiduciary duty,
which is not predicated on a showing of personal harm. 9 ' The code
standards are not controlling in civil litigation, but they have
become relevant.'9 ' Code changes thus might ease a plaintiffs
burden of establishing a breach of fiduciary duty. Nevertheless, as
a practical matter they would do little to help a plaintiff prove
recoverable damages.
One might therefore argue that for any changes in the profes-
sional codes to be effective, they must be accompanied by legislation
that allows the recovery of statutory damages for violations of
retainer ethics. A statutory scheme governing only the retainer
stage, however, would be peculiar. Although violations of retainer
ethics may be frequent, they arguably are not among the most
harmful ethical violations that recur-particularly if we assume
that in most instances the retained attorney ultimately provides
competent representation. States have adopted statutory damage
remedies only rarely,'92 so one would expect that these should be
confined to the most serious, frequent, or otherwise unenforceable
situations.
One additional consequence of revising the professional standards
to include objective advice at the retainer stage bears mentioning.
In a sense, emphasizing candor on the lawyer's part may be
inconsistent with the proposition that it is important for clients to
trust counsel. 93 Suppose a lawyer, immediately upon meeting a
prospective client, provides his realistic evaluation of the case-
190. See authorities cited supra notes 175-76.
191. See, e.g., Avianca, Inc. v. Harrison, No. 94-7053, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30863, at *5
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 1995) ("Viewing evidence of a [Disciplinary Rule] violation as creating a
rebuttable presumption of a violation of an attorney's fiduciary duty to his or her client is in
accord with the law in the District of Columbia."); Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 846-47
(D.C. 1994) ("[A] violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or of the Rules of
Professional Conduct can constitute a breach of the attorney's common law fiduciary duty to
the client.").
192. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6128 (West 2003) (rendering a lawyer's
participation in deceit or collusion a misdemeanor, subject to a $2500 fine); id. § 6153
(subjecting lawyers who engage in unlawful solicitation to criminal punishment, including
fines).
193. Cf. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 36, at 386 (noting the tension
among candor, trust, and client autonomy in considering whether lawyers should inform
clients of exceptions to attorney-client confidentiality).
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warts included---even though the prospective client is not yet
prepared to receive a disappointing evaluation. Instead of simply
accepting the information and using it in her calculus regarding her
options, the client may react in two undesirable ways: the client
may choose to engage a different, less objective and candid lawyer;
or, she may retain this counsel, but mistrust his willingness to
pursue her interests.
These are somewhat realistic risks. Nevertheless, lawyers should
be able to couch negative information in terms that will not alienate
the prospective client. Honesty at the start of the representation can
be used to build a trust relationship, rather than destroy it.
Conversely, the practice of postponing negative information until
after the client commits to the case may negatively affect the trust
relationship-doubly so because the client may feel that she was
induced into hiring the lawyer. On balance, the danger that candor
at the outset will undermine trust relationships seems outweighed
by the benefits for client autonomy and improved decision making.
C. Ramifications of Changing the Law
Let us assume that a state amends its professional code and
common law to clarify a lawyer's fiduciary obligations at the
retainer stage. Let us also make the realistic assumption that well-
meaning lawyers will attempt to satisfy the duties identified in the
codes and that others will ignore the guidance in the rules to the
extent that they can. How would the changes in the law ultimately
affect the provision of legal services? The effects may be felt in three
general areas: (1) the quality of services provided to clients; (2) the
availability of lawyers to provide particular services; and (3) the
structure and focus of the bar.
One direct impact of the proposed changes would be that potential
clients would come to place a higher premium on hiring lawyers who
are specialists and that lawyers would have a greater incentive to
develop and publicize their expertise. By definition, the codes would
require lawyers to refer more matters to specialists, or at least to
identify their existence. The level of deception by non-specialists in
order to attract business should remain constant. Although the ben-
efits of falsely claiming expertise may rise somewhat, the potential
costs of doing so would increase concurrently.
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Globally, the emphasis on specialization should enhance the
quality of services clients receive. There is simply no basis for
assuming that non-specialists who teach themselves the law in a
particular area in order to handle a specific matter provide equal or
better service than those who are experienced and trained in the
field. Moreover, to the extent lawyers fulfill their duty of candor at
the retainer stage, their relationships with clients whom they
ultimately enlist should improve. The necessity of acting overtly in
the clients' interests even before receiving a fee will help establish
trust, which in turn can ameliorate the quality of the subsequent
representation.
The impact on the availability of legal services is less certain. At
least initially, the emphasis on specialization will result in more
potential clients demanding the services of fewer attorneys who fit
the bill. Specialists will increase fees accordingly. The corresponding
fees of generalists willing to take on the representation may need to
decrease in order for the generalists to compete. Some generalists
who were willing to provide representation at previous fee levels
may not be equally available under the new regime.
Over time, two effects on the availability of services are possible:
more generalists may come to disregard the rules governing retainer
ethics and more lawyers may seek to develop and publicize special
expertise. Side effects also are likely. One would certainly expect an
increase in advertising by specialists directed to other lawyers. The
market may develop methods for increasing the transparency of
fees, either through voluntary reporting to the bar or external
mechanisms developed by consumer groups. The number of pure
generalists-lawyers who simply hang up their shingle and expect
to handle whatever business walks through the door-is likely to
decrease.
Of course, the bar itself would need to respond. If regulators
expect lawyers to discuss their own expertise with potential clients
and to become aware of the expertise of others, the profession must
develop a better vocabulary and attitude governing the circulation
of specialization information. Rather than simply adopting rules
designed to limit false claims by lawyers, 9 4 more attention would
194. This goal is the thrust of the typical advertising and solicitation prohibitions. See, e.g.,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6157.1 (West 2003) (providing that advertisements may not contain
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need to be paid to legitimate methods for lawyers to establish and
disseminate the fact of their expertise. Rigorous specialty licensing
and specialty bar examinations might become more common.19
Reexamination may become necessary to establish different levels
of expertise for practitioners of varying levels of experience. Bar
referrals according to specialty would probably need to focus more
on specific training and experience that lawyers would have to
establish to the referring agencies' satisfaction. And the practicing
bar may come to call upon disciplinary agencies to enforce rules
that address misleading specialty claims.'96 If bar associations do
not develop methods for distinguishing among lawyers, private
organizations may fill the void.'97
false, misleading, or deceptive statements).
195. See, e.g., Harry J. Haynsworth, Post-Graduate Legal Education in the United States,
43 S. TEX. L. REV. 403, 404-05 (2002) (noting the proliferation of formal specialization
programs that require peer review and testing); Kevin Hopkins, The Politics of Misconduct:
Rethinking How We Regulate Lawyer-Politicians, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 839, 868-69 (2005)
(noting the increasing barriers facing lawyers seeking specialization in specific practice areas
during the latter part of the twentieth century, including competency examinations); John A.
Sexton, "Out of the Box" Thinking About the Training of Lawyers in the Next Millenium, 43
S. TEX. L. REV. 623, 624-25 (2002) (predicting an increasingly stratified profession with a
variety of specialty certification processes similar to bar exams); Fred C. Zacharias, The Legal
Profession in the Year 2050, 15 WIDENER L.J. 253, 261 (2006) (predicting increased use of
specialization examinations); cf. Evans & Cunningham, supra note 32, at 991 (noting that
"[clertification in [1]egal specialities [hias [b]een [s]lower to [c]atch on than [e]xpected,' [and]
... that there are still very few private organizations that certify lawyers as specialists"
(quoting Lisa L. Granite, In No Hurry to Specialize, THE PENN. LAWYER, May-June 2001, at
24)); Kilpatrick, supra note 32, at 298 (stating that most states that established certifying
organizations by 1997 did require some form of examination for certification as a specialist);
Certified Specialists, httpJ/www.azbar.org/LegalResources/findspecialist_text.cfm (last visited
Oct. 13, 2007) (mandating the passage of a written examination for certification in Arizona);
Exam Information, The State Bar of California, http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar-
generic.jsp?cid=11584&id=9188 (last visited Oct. 13, 2007) (describing one day specialist
examinations required of lawyers wishing to be certified as specialists in California).
196. Cf. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do, supra note 11, at 980-82 (demonstrating the current
underenforcement of rules prohibiting specialization claims).
197. One might expect organizations such as the Consumers Union to produce reports
evaluating lawyers, as the Consumers Union attempted to do in the days before lawyer
advertising was permitted. See Consumers Union v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 427 F. Supp. 506, 506-07
(E.D. Va. 1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (upholding Consumer Union's challenge to
Virginia's legal advertising rules).
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D. Alternatives
The practical consequences of changing the law suggests that it
behooves society to consider alternative methods for improving
prospective clients' abilities to select lawyers. On one hand, society
would like consumers of legal services to have better information
available about the quality or experience of particular lawyers. On
the other hand, it may be important not to construct a system under
which lawyers either are driven from practice or have inordinate
incentives to mislead potential clients. A few options are discussed
below-tentatively, and only for purposes of opening debate.'98
1. Grading Lawyers
One option is to develop a mechanism for grading lawyers. The
concept is not entirely new. For decades, Martindale-Hubbell has
assigned some lawyers "able very" ratings and withheld the rating
from others.'99 Although its system for ranking lawyers has
improved over time, it remains subjective-based on surveys and
references submitted by the lawyers being evaluated. °° The ratings
benefit older attorneys2"' and are assigned to law firms based on the
198. This Article does not purport to analyze these alternatives fully, but merely offers
them as suggestions that merit further investigation. The option of improving clients' access
to reputation information is discussed in more detail in Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of
Reputation on the Legal Profession, WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
199. See LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell, Peer Review Ratings-Explanation, http://www.
martindale.com/xp/Martindale/Peer_Review_Rankings/ratings-explanation.xml (last visited
Oct. 13, 2007) (explaining Martindale-Hubbell's two-letter rating system, including an A, B,
or C to denote legal ability, followed by an ethical standards rating).
200. See LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell, Peer Review Ratings-The Process, http://www.
martindale.com/xp/MartindalefPeerReviewRatings/ratings-process.xml (last visited Oct.
13, 2007) (describing the ratings process). In recent years, other private entities have
attempted to market competing ratings sources. See, e.g., Best lawyers in America,
http://www.bestlawyers.com/aboutus/selectionprocess.aspx (last visited Aug. 16, 2007); Super
Lawyers, http://www.superlawyers.com/index.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2007); The Chambers
USA Guide, http://www.chambers andpartners.com/usa/research-ranking.aspx (last visited
Oct. 13, 2007).
201. See LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell, Peer Review Ratings-Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.martindale.com/xp/Martindale/PeerReview_Ratings/ratings-faqs.xml
(last visited Oct. 13, 2007) ("A lawyer must be admitted to the bar for 10 years or more to
receive an AV rating"); see also LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell, Peer Review Ratings-
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firm's "highest rated active partner."2 °2 Lawyers who receive a poor
rating may "request not to have any rating published."2 3 For
marketing reasons, Martindale-Hubbell's "Peer Review Rating
Specialists work closely with Martindale-Hubbell's larger law firm
clients to educate, engage and assist their lawyers in the Peer
Review Process and the marketing opportunities surrounding the
Peer Review Ratings. 2 4 The publication's rankings also are
available only to potential clients who subscribe, or otherwise have
access, to the publication. 20
5
Two alternative types of rating institutions spring to mind. Local
bar associations might evaluate lawyers based on information
submitted by attorneys and collected independently by the bar.
Alternatively, after each case, the courts might assign a grade
corresponding to the performance of each lawyer. Such grades could
be assembled mechanically and made available to the public.0 6
Both mechanisms have obvious drawbacks. The bar may not have
the resources to evaluate lawyers. To the extent that it does, the bar
is likely to emphasize factors that may be subjective or irrelevant to
Explanation, http://www.martindale.com/xp/MartindalePeerReview_- Ratingsratings_ expla
nation.xml (last visited Oct. 13, 2007) (describing maximum possible ratings achievable by
lawyers with 5-9 years of experience and 3-4 years of experience. Lawyers with less than three
years of experience are not rated).
202. LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell, Peer Review Ratings-Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.martindale.com/xp/MartindalePeerReviewRatings/ratings faqs.xml (last visited
Oct. 13, 2007).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. In 1989, the ABA recommended that judges appointing lawyers in capital cases limit
appointments to lawyers satisfying particular criteria, including five years of litigation
experience in the field of criminal defense; prior experience as lead counsel in at least nine
jury trials that have been tried to conclusion; experience as lead or co-counsel in at least one
death penalty case; and completion of a training program on criminal advocacy in cases in
which the death penalty is sought within one year of their appointment as counsel. AM. BAR
ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES, Guideline 5.1 (1)(A) (1989). Co-counsel in capital cases were expected to satisfy the
following criteria: three years active litigation experience in the field of criminal defense; prior
experience as lead or co-counsel in at least three serious and complex jury trials of which at
least two involved murder or aggravated murder charges, or one involved murder or
aggravated murder trial and one felony trial; and completion of a training program on
criminal advocacy in cases in which the death penalty is sought within one year of their
appointment as counsel. Id. guideline 5.1 (1)(B). In effect, this called upon courts to grade
lawyers, though on an objective basis.
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performance, such as participation in bar activities, connections
with bar officials, or years in practice. Courts assigning grades could
only do so with respect to litigated matters, and what judges see
may not correspond neatly with a lawyer's out of court performance.
Consequently, courts would need to scrutinize the rating methodol-
ogy and criteria carefully before implementing any grading mecha-
nism.
Assuming that one could limit a grading procedure to appropriate
contexts and that the bar or courts would implement the procedure
carefully, the question remains: what factors would be relevant to
the grading of lawyers? One possibility is to limit the evaluations to
purely objective factors, including experience, specialty training,
results of specialization examinations, and (if available) a composite
of grades assigned by the judges at the conclusion of each litigated
case. The problem with such criteria is that they provide limited
information. Except in one regard, experience is a neutral factor;0 v
it does not reveal how well a lawyer has performed in previous
cases. Similarly, participating in continuing legal education courses
and expertise in taking exams may not translate well into practical
performance in representing clients. Judicial evaluations are
skewed, both in the types of practice they evaluate and in their
inherent dependence on what qualities judges value in lawyers.
A second alternative is to extend the assessment process to
include semi-objective factors, including training (e.g., the quality
of the law school each lawyer attended), references, and disciplinary
history. These criteria are partly subjective; for example, the eval-
uating body must assign a value to each law school and references
may vary based on each lawyer's circle of friends. Nevertheless,
evaluations based on such criteria do provide information that
might not otherwise be available to potential clients.
The final alternative offers the best hope for meaningful or
tailored grading but, at the same time, has the most potential for
misuse, or even abuse. The bar could evaluate each lawyer on a
subjective basis, based on a periodic (for example, five year) review
that takes into account a series of factors developed by the rating
207. Extensive experience, however, does suggest that the lawyer has represented clients
well enough that he is able to remain in the field; in other words, it is some indication of how
the market views his performance.
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agency-perhaps even including observations of the lawyer's
performance."°8 Of course, such a grading system would be labor
intensive, as it contemplates that the bar will evaluate lawyers
more personally and directly than it examines new applicants for
admission. On the other hand, it would provide an element sorely
lacking in the administration of lawyer licensing, namely, post-
admission review that enables the bar to maintain some oversight
over the performance of lawyers.
2. Publishing Information About Lawyer Reputations
It is perhaps surprising that, given the current vacuum in
information about lawyers, consumer-oriented publications have not
filled the void. In part, the absence of periodicals evaluating lawyers
simply reflects the fact that the information is difficult to compile
and may change quickly. A similar absence of attention from rating
services is evident with respect to many other professions as well,
specifically medicine and psychology.
There is, however, a second explanation for the scarcity of
publications assessing lawyers. The bar, and bar regulation, has
interposed obstacles to the gathering of information, particularly
comparative information.' Advertising rules seem to forbid lawyer
208. The argument that such an evaluation would be impossible or too subjective is belied
by the practice of bar associations that evaluate the qualifications of judicial nominees.
Although evaluating a portion of the entire bar each year would require more resources, it can
be done.
209. For example, N.J. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.1(a)(3) (2007) provides that, "A lawyer
shall not make false or misleading communications about the lawyer, the lawyer's services,
or any matter in which the lawyer has or seeks a professional involvement. A communication
is false or misleading if it ... compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services ...."
The New Jersey bar relied on this rule to prevent lawyers from participating in and
advertising peer review media surveys that result in the identification of some lawyers as
"Super Lawyers," on the basis that that designation is "inherently comparative." N.J. Comm.
on Attorney Advertising, Op. 39 (2006). The Virginia bar likewise issued an opinion that
lawyers could not advertise their inclusion in a publication listing "Best Lawyers in America,"
but withdrew its opinion and revised its disciplinary rule as a result of a settlement of
litigation contesting the action. See Allen, Allen, Allen & Allen v. Williams, 254 F. Supp. 2d
614 (E.D. Va. 2003) (issuing a preliminary injunction in the Virginia case); RE: APRL 1st
amendment yields to atty regulation, Website posting of Jim McCauley (July 20, 2006)
(describing the history of the Virginia matter) (on file with author). Some states apparently
are more tolerant of comparative advertising. See William W. Yavinsky, A Comparative Look
at Comparative Advertising: Why Efforts to Prohibit Evaluative Rankings Spark Debate from
Buffalo to Buenos Aires, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 969, 986-87 (2007) (comparing states'
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participation in providing information to evaluators.21 ° If lawyers
dare provide any information, they must be particularly careful to
avoid describing their fees, because any publication of fee informa-
tion that is attributable to them may become binding.211 Indeed,
when Consumer Reports attempted to produce a test periodical in
the 1970s, the ABA opposed the publication in court.212
Nevertheless, society's and courts' negative attitudes toward
publicizing information concerning lawyers' practices has softened
over time. The best alternative to regulating the information that
individual lawyers must provide potential clients is to facilitate the
provision of information regarding all lawyers in the local bar
through an independent mechanism. The bar arguably has an
interest not only in allowing the publication of information regard-
ing the specialties, fees, and areas of competence of lawyers, but
also in facilitating the collection and dissemination of such informa-
tion.
approaches).
210. Rules like Model Rule 7.2 forbid lawyers to make certain advertisements, MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2 (2006), while Model Rule 8.4(a) forbids them to violate the
rules of professional conduct "through the acts of another." Id. R. 8.4(a). More specific state
prohibitions forbid the use of "testimonials" from third persons and the like. See, e.g., ARK.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2007) (treating a lawyer's communication as false or
misleading if it contains a testimonial); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.2(b)(1)(E)
(2003) (prohibiting testimonials); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.02 cmt.
4 (2007) (prohibiting testimonials from past clients); WYO. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 7. 1(d)
(2006) (treating a communication containing a testimonial or endorsement as false or
misleading); cf. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-400 Standard (2) (2005) (presumptively
forbidding testimonials).
211. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(f) (2006) (requiring lawyers to honor
advertised fees for at least sixty days); FLA. RULES OF PROFVL CONDUCT R. 4-7.2(c)(5) (2003)
(requiring fees advertised in annual publications to be honored for one year and fees
advertised in other advertisements to be honored for ninety days); PA. RULES OF PROFOL
CONDUCT R. 7.2(h)(2) (2007) (binding lawyers to advertised fees for a period between ninety
days and one year).
212. See Consumers Union v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 427 F. Supp. 506, 507 (E.D. Va. 1976),
vacated, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (finding Virginia's anti-advertising rules unconstitutionally
overbroad in restricting Consumers Union's ability to gather information on attorneys' initial
consultation fees and other consumer information). In a recent example of the same
phenomenon, the Texas State Bar forbade lawyers to participate in an Internet "matching
service" in which they described their practices and qualifications for the purpose of enabling
the service to match clients with suitable lawyers. The bar concluded that this service
constituted an impermissible referral service. See FTC Urges, supra note 107, at 284. The
FrC urged the Texas Bar to reconsider on the basis that the Texas Bar's view deprived
consumers of valuable information. Id. at 285.
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The bar could gather and make this information available on its
own, using surveys distributed with annual bar dues invoices. It
could support bar-related or independent publications committed to
conducting surveys. At a minimum, bar regulators might create
express exceptions to professional rules, such as advertising rules,
that appear to foreclose lawyer cooperation with independent
publications seeking to provide objective information regarding
lawyer practices. The bar might go so far as to certify those
publications whose methodologies qualify as sufficiently scientific
to guarantee neutrality.
In the modern era, Internet technology provides alternative
methods for the dissemination of evaluations of lawyers. Many
clients select lawyers after consulting their websites. Those sites
therefore seem to be an appropriate repository for rating informa-
tion concerning the listed lawyers.
Here again, bar associations have become part of the problem
rather than part of the solution. Law firms attempting to provide
testimonials or references from former clients have confronted
disapproval by regulators. Florida and other states forbid the
posting of references, on the theory that former clients cannot
reasonably evaluate the performance their lawyers provided and
that matters vary so much in their nature that any evaluation in a
previous case would be irrelevant to the selection of a lawyer in a
subsequent matter.21 Accordingly, regulators have concluded that
potential clients are better served by receiving less information,
rather than more.
This attitude seems short-sighted. Although references from
former clients are sometimes of limited utility, it is far too pater-
nalistic to assume that clients perceive nothing about their
representation accurately. The key for the bar is not to forbid the
use of references and testimonials, but rather to regulate them
213. See FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.2 cmt. (2003) (stating that testimonials are
prohibited because the public is likely to draw the incorrect conclusion that the advertising
lawyer will get the same results in future cases); see also ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
7.1 cmt. 1 (2007) (prohibiting endorsements on the basis that an attorney's work for previous
clients should not be compared without reference to specific factual and legal circumstances);
COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. (2000) (stating that unsubstantiated results
obtained for previous clients are likely to mislead prospective clients); D.C. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 1 (1999) (stating that client endorsements are likely to create
unjustifiable expectations).
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wisely-perhaps even collecting references for all lawyers on a
single bar-monitored site and requiring lawyers to advise all past
clients that they can submit evaluations.214 Requiring disclaimers
or warning labels makes sense, as in the regulation of advertising
of other products. Some rules governing how references are collected
and selected for publication might also be appropriate. But overall,
potential clients can benefit from what prior clients have to say. To
the extent that it is possible to ease the potential client's burden in
obtaining references, the bar should facilitate, rather than hinder,
that process.
3. Cataloguing Success Information on a Scientific Basis
Bar regulators have shown similar antipathy toward publication
by lawyers of information regarding their past success in a category
of representation.215 Of course, past success in one case is not a
strong predictor of success in a subsequent unrelated matter.
Unsophisticated recipients of such information may form inaccurate
impressions from it.2" 6 Nevertheless, realistically, how well a lawyer
has done in the past is important information that all potential
clients should wish to know.
Again, the bar is in a position to facilitate the collection of such
information and present it in the least misleading form. The bar
could obtain and catalogue success information on a relatively
scientific basis-including categorizing like matters, comparing
results across the bar, and identifying the range of average results.
214. This procedure was recently suggested in David McGowan's legal ethics blog. See
Posting of David McGowan to Legal Ethics Forum, State Bar Websites and Reputational
Feedback, http://legalethicsforum.typepad.com/blog/2006/06/state barwebsi.html (June. 4,
2006) (encouraging "state bars [to] provide forums for clients to provide feedback on their
lawyers.... [A]ttorneys could be required to link to the forum from firm pages, or individual
lawyer pages, and to provide a JRL on soliciting materials and retention letters ...").
215. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6158.1 (2003) (establishing a rebuttable
presumption that statements of past success are false, misleading, or deceptive); FLA. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.2(b)(1)(B) (2003) (prohibiting references to past results); TEX.
DIScIPLINARY RULES OF PROWVL CONDUCT R. 7.02 cmt. 4 (2007) (prohibiting advertising of past
results in ordinary circumstances); WYO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 3 (2006)
(noting that statements describing past results may be precluded by the rule forbidding
misleading or false communications).
216. In other words, potential clients may believe the lawyer can reproduce the success in
their cases, even though the prior cases may have been substantially different.
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Success information seems most useful if it represents the totality
of each lawyer's cases within a category. It also is pertinent only to
the extent that it can be compared to the results other lawyers
obtain. Such information will not be available, however, unless all
lawyers are required to collect and provide it.217
Consequently, it may be useful for the bar to fulfill the function
of generating and analyzing data regarding lawyer success. To that
end, the bar would need to develop forms for the collection of
information and to educate lawyers regarding their use. Of course,
not all fields of practice lend themselves to objective measures of
success (e.g., results of litigation in a particular type of case). But to
the extent the bar can centralize this data, present it in a user-
friendly format, and educate consumers regarding its importance
(and sometimes lack thereof), the bar would obviate consumers'
desire or need to identify the information on their own.
4. Making Use of Fee-sharing Practices
In California, a jurisdiction with idiosyncratic rules, a confluence
of unusual circumstances creates a de facto mechanism for matching
some clients with suitable lawyers. California allows lawyers to
accept cases, refer the clients to specialized (or better) attorneys,
and then share in the fees even without personally performing in
the matter.21 The referring lawyers have incentives to send clients
to the best lawyer for their case, because the referral fees typically
are based on success in the matter.219 Moreover, the referring
lawyers have access to information that unsophisticated clients
ordinarily do not know or use regarding the experience of lawyers
to whom they make referrals; namely, published information
regarding past results in litigation and settlements.22 ° In effect, the
217. In some jurisdictions, result information for litigated matters is published, but
typically in a form usable only by lawyers and sophisticated clients with access to legal search
engines. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
218. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2-200(A) (2005) (permitting referral fees so long
as the client gives consent and the total fee does not exceed what would otherwise be
charged).
219. See id. R. 2-200(A)(2).
220. This data is available in such publications as California Trial Digest and can be
organized by type of case and result through Westlaw and, perhaps, other search engines.
Other states may have similar publications, but they become significant for our purposes only
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combination of the availability of this data and the state's lax
professional regulation regarding referral fees enables (or causes)
clients to pay for good reputation information by hiring the interme-
diary.
Most jurisdictions do not allow such referral arrangements, for
good reason.22' They inflate the cost of representation, because the
cost of paying the referred to or referred from lawyer can be built
into the original fee proposal sub rosa. In the absence of strong rate
competition, the California rules effectively enable referring lawyers
to charge substantially for little work. Clients often do not know
precisely what they are paying for.
Nevertheless, the California mechanism is intriguing on several
fronts. It suggests an alternative mode of regulation: limiting lawyer
referral fees, but specifically allowing lawyers to act as intermediar-
ies. As in California, to maintain referring lawyers' incentives to
refer clients to highly qualified lawyers, the level of allowable
referral fees would need to be based on successful results in the
underlying representation. Referral fee limits therefore could not
take the form of absolute caps. Instead, the rules might define
appropriate contingent recoveries for referring attorneys, confining
those to an amount clients reasonably might pay for the pleasure of
obtaining a good referral.222
The California experience also highlights the availability of
useful data that can be the basis for selecting attorneys, similar
to the catalogued verdict and settlement information described
previously. 3 If referring attorneys in California can employ such
if they are combined with lawyers' ability to profit from using the data in making referrals.
221. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2006) ("A division of a fee
between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if: (1) the division is in
proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint
responsibility for the representation .... ); MODEL CODE OF PROFVL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-
107(A)(2) (1976) (permitting division of fees only to the extent "[t]he division is made in
proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each").
222. Many referrals involve plaintiffs' contingency work, so the referring and receiving
lawyer can simply agree to divide the contingency. In cases in which the work will be
performed according to an hourly rate, the rules would need to limit referral fees to successful
cases and identify some formula or mechanism for determining success (for example, upon a
settlement or verdict that both sides can claim as a victory). The rulemakers may find it more
difficult to prescribe appropriate referral fees when the matter is not designed to generate a
pool of money that can be divided into contingencies.
223. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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data, there is no reason why bar associations could not gather and
publish it in a consumer-friendly form. The bar could even consider
using the data-combined, perhaps, with supplemental information
regarding rates collected from the subject practitioners-to create
its own referral list.
If the bar does not wish to interpret the data directly, a poten-
tially controversial alternative might be to require referring lawyers
to inform the bar of each referral and the nature of the case in
which it is made. By collecting this data and making it available to
consumers, the bar would enable prospective clients to learn which
lawyers are most trusted by their peers in particular types of cases.
Of course, this approach would open the door to cooperative games
by referring and receiving lawyers that ultimately might corrupt the
data. It nevertheless is an approach that has promise for improving
the state of knowledge that consumers of legal services currently
have.
E. An Observation About the Proposed Alternatives
The above alternatives, or possible supplements, to clarifying
lawyers' retainer obligations all focus on the goal of providing
consumers with information and additional avenues for evaluating
possible representatives. Each approach has some attraction, but
also presents potential practical difficulties that require careful
analysis before implementation. The practical concerns may prove
fatal to some or all of the options. This Article has presented the
options merely as food for thought.
The same is not true, however, for this Article's principal
conclusion-that lawyers have ethical obligations at the retainer
stage and it is important for these to be highlighted through
interpretation or clarification of the professional rules and common
law. The main danger of implementing this conclusion is that an
approach focusing on lawyers' ethical obligations will prove inef-
fective, or only marginally effective. This Article has suggested,
however, that there would nonetheless be benefits to pursuing that
course. If alternatives such as those discussed above ultimately are
deemed preferable, implementing them would make little sense
without initial recognition by the profession both that consumers'
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interests are at risk and that the bar has a role to play in assuring
that prospective clients are well served.
CONCLUSION
Laypersons who visit lawyers for the first time have, in different
settings, been conceptualized as independent unrelated parties,
prospective clients, clients for limited purposes, and actual clients.
The characterizations of their relationships with the attorneys
whom they consult have been equally diverse, ranging from arm's
length to fiduciary in nature. Often, the labels assume the answer
to the question of what, or how much, the lawyers owe the consult-
ing person. At a minimum, however, it is fair to say that virtually
everyone who has considered any aspect of the question has agreed
that lawyers sometimes have some responsibilities in dealing with
potential clients that a stranger or non-lawyer service provider
might not have.
This Article does not resolve the issue of what lawyers' ethical
and legal obligations to potential clients are. Nor does it offer a firm
vision of how lawyers' responsibilities, if any, should be imple-
mented or enforced. The cost-benefit analysis of whether particular
forms of enhanced regulation can be effective and worth the costs is
for another day.
The Article has, however, brought the issues to light, identified
their complexity, and offered preliminary insights regarding the
approaches courts and bar associations might take to them. In
opening the debate, the Article lays a foundation that should cause
future decision makers and commentators on lawyers' obligations
to prospective clients to take seriously the reasons why lawyers
might have special responsibilities in the preemployment setting.
Hopefully, those decision makers and commentators will forgo
simple labeling and instead address, in a practical and realistic way,
both clients' needs and that which society can reasonably expect of
the bar.
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